Government-Owned Corporations and Intergovernmental Tax Immunity by Freedman, Walter
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 1 
January 1938 
Government-Owned Corporations and Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunity 
Walter Freedman 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Walter Freedman, Government-Owned Corporations and Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, 24 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 046 (1938). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
46 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATIONS AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY*
WALTER FREEDMANt
Until the World War the Government confined itself largely
to incorporating private enterprises such as banks,1 railroads, 2
telegraph companies,3 bridge companies,, et cetera. During this
period few corporations were formed over which the Govern-
ment exercised management and controlA The first government
venture into the revenue-producing corporation was in 1904 with
the purchase of the Panama Railroad Company as an incident to
the much more familiar project, the Panama Canal.0 Then fol-
lowed the purchase of the Alaska Railway.7 In 1917 the Federal
Land Banks were organized for the purpose of relieving the farm
credit crisis.8
With the entry of the United States into the World War the
government-owned corporation as an administartive unit ap-
peared in aggrandized form.0 Within sixteen months there were
* The substance of this article is taken largely from the writer's paper
prepared last year under Professors Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Reed
Powell of Harvard University Law School.
t A.B., Washington University, 1937; LL.B., 1937; LL.M., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1938. Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. (1864) 13 Stat. 100, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 21; (1885) 22 Stat.
162; (1902) 32 Stat. 102; (1922) 42 Stat. 767; (1936) 12 U. S. C. A.
sec. 24; (1933) 48 Stat. 184, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 24; Farmers'
National Bank v. Deering (1875) 91 U. S. 29.
2. (1862) 12 Stat. 489; (1864) 13 Stat. 365; (1871) 16 Stat. 573; Cali-
fornia v. Central Pacific Railroad (1877) 127 U. S. 1.
3. (1866) 14 Stat. 221, (1928) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 1; Pensacola Tele-
graph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph (1877) 96 U. S. 1.
4. (1890) 26 Stat. 268, (1927) 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 592; Luxton v. North
River Bridge (1894) 153 U. S. 525.
5. Smithsonian Institute (1846) 9 Stat. 103, (1929) 20 U. S. C. A. sec.
57; National Academy of Science (1863) 12' Stat. 806; National Soldiers'
Home (1866) 14 Stat. 10, (1927) 24 U. S. C. A. sec. 71; Harvard Univer-
sity (1867) 18 Stat. 438.
6. (1904) 33 Stat. 429; (1902) 32 Stat. 481, (1928) 44 U. S. C. A. sec.
227; Wilson v. Shaw (1906) 204 U. S. 24; New York ex rel. Rogers v.
Graves (1937) 299 U. S. 401. See Dimock, Government Owned Enterprises
in the Panama Canal Zone (1934).
7. (1914) 38 Stat. 305, (1928) 48 U. S. C. A. sees. 301-308; (1915) 30
Ops. Att'y Gen. 332; (1915) 31 Ops. Att'y Gen. 597; (1924) 34 Ops. Att'y
Gen. 232.
8. (1916) 39 Stat. 362, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 671-683; Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 180.
9. Van Dorn, Government-Owned Corporations (1926) cc. 1-7, 10.
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established the United State Emergency Fleet Corporation,0 the
United States Grain Corporation," the United States Housing
Corporation, 12 the War Finance Corporation, 3 the Sugar Equali-
zation Board,1' the Spruce Production Corporation,15 and the
Russian Bureau, Incorporated.16 The Federal Intermediate Credit
Banks" and the Inland Waterways Corporation 8 represent the
only post-war federal-owned corporations organized before the
business depression of 1929.
Nation-wide unemployment and financial collapse greeted the
Roosevelt administration on March 4, 1933. The government-
owned corporation'9 was one convenient 20 device selected to pro-
10. Incorporated in District of Columbia by United States Shipping
Board. (1916) 39 Stat. 728, (1928) 46 U. S. C. A. sec. 801; (1917) 40
Stat. 182; Exec. Order No. 2664, July 17, 1917. The shipping Board has
been abolished and its functions transferred to the Department of Com-
merce by authority of Exec. Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933, issued under
the Reorganization Act of March 3, 1933. 47 Stat. 1517, (1938 Supp.) 5
U. S. C. A. sec. 124. Approved in (1933) 37 Ops. Att'y Gen. 238; Ostrandt-
sen Moller Co., Inc. v. United States (1937) 300 U. S. 139.
11. Created by Exec. Order No. 2681, Aug. 14, 1917, pursuant to Food
Control Act (1917) 40 Stat. 276.
12. (1918) 40 Stat. 550, (1928) 34 U. S. C. A. sec. 1042.
13. (1918) 40 Stat. 506, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 331; (1920) 32 Ops.
Att'y Gen. 181. The War Finance Corporation was ordered liquidated in
1925. 43 Stat. 14, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 371. By the Act of March 1,
1929, 45 Stat. 1442, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 374, the liquidation
of the remaining assets and the winding up of the affairs of the Corpora-
tion were transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury.
14. Incorporated in Delaware by the Food Administrator with the ap-
proval of the President. No formal executive order was issued.
15. (1918) 40 Stat. 888, (1928) 50 U. S. C. A. sec. 172.
16. Incorporated in Connecticut by the War Trade Board.
17. (1923) 42 Stat. 1454, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. secs. 1021-1026. This
corporation is now under the control of the Farm Credit Administrator.
Executive Order No. 6084, March 27, 1933.
18. (1924) 43 Stat. 360, (1929) 49 U. S. C. A. secs. 151, 152; Dimock,
Developing American Waterways (1935).
19. Brief mention should be made of the difficult problem of selecting a
term fitting to connote the corporations. The word "corporation" describes
their structure. It is more difficult to find the appropriate word to describe
their activities. The terms "proprietary," "business," or "private" are
faulty because they presuppose a commercial functioning, and because these
obfuscating catch-words are likely to be confused with their use in the
field of governmental tort liability. Sheer convenience, then, prompts the
use of the term "government-owned" or simply "government corporation."
Substitution of the word "federal" or "state" for "government" is not un-
justified.
A survey of the relevant statutes, executive orders, and charters re-
veals that structurally the corporations are of essentially three types. Some
of the corporations are wholly government-owned: Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (1932) 47 Stat. 5, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 601; R. F. C.
Mortgage Co. (1935) 49 Stat. 3, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 606i;
Tennessee Valley Authority (1933) 48 Stat. 58, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A.
1938]
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mote the administration's effort to advance industrial recovery.
The role of officialdom as the regulator of industry was sup-
sec. 831; Commodity Credit Corp., Exec. Order No. 6340, Oct. 16, 1933,
(1935) 49 Stat. 3, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sees. 606a, 606j; (1937) 50
Stat. 5, (1938 Supp.) 12 U. S. C. A. see. 1020i; Electric Home and Farm
Authority, successor to Electric Home and Farm Authority, Inc., of Dela-
ware, Exec. Order No. 6514, Dec. 19, 1933; Exec. Order No. 7139, Aug. 12,
1935, (1936) 49 Stat. 1186, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 702; (1937)
50 Stat. 3; Disaster Loan Corp. (1937) 50 Stat. 19, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S.
C. A. sees. 605k, 6051; Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (1923) 42 Stat.
1454, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1021; (1933) 48 Stat. 271, (1936) 12
U. S. C. A. sees. 1022, 1031; Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (1934)
48 Stat. 344, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1020; Home Owners' Loan Corp.
(1933) 48 Stat. 128, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 1461, 1462; Export-Import
Bank of Washington, Exec. Order No. 6581, Feb. 2, 1934, (1935) 49 Stat.
4, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sees. 605e, 606b; (1937) 50 Stat. 5, (1938
Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 702 note; Federal Surplus Commodities Corp.,
successor to Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (1937) 50 Stat. 27; Farm-
ers' Home Corp. (1937) 50 Stat. 527, (1938 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A. see. 1014;
Federal Crop. Ins. Corp., Pub. No. 430, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (Feb. 16, 1938) ;
Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (1934) 48 Stat. 1211, (1938 Supp.) 18
U. S. C. A. sec. 744i; Textile Foundations (1930) 46 Stat. 539, (1938 Supp.)
15 U. S. C. A. sees. 501-503; Chemical Society (1937) 50 Stat. 798; Inland
Waterways Corporation (1924) 43 Stat. 360, (1929) 49 U. S. C. A. sees.
151, 152; Panama Railroad Corp. (1904) 33 Stat. 429; Alaska Railroad
Corp. (1914) 38 Stat. 305, (1928) 48 U. S. C. A. sees. 301-308. Some are
partially government-owned and partially private-owned: Federal Land
Banks (1916) 39 Stat. 362, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 671-683; Exec.
Order No. 6084, March 27, 1933; (1933) 48 Stat. 269, (1936) 12 U. S.
C. A. see. 678; Federal Home Loan Banks (1932) 47 Stat. 725, (1936)
12 U. S. C. A. sees. 1421, 1422; Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.
(1934) 48 Stat. 1256, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1725; Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. (1933) 48 Stat. 168, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 263, 264.
Others are completely privately owned but federally chartered and super-
vised: National Farm Loan Associations (1916) 39 Stat. 365, (1936) 12
U. S. C. A. sees. 711-722; Central Bank and Banks for Cooperatives (1933)
48 Stat. 261, 264, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1134b, c, f, j, m; Production
Credit Corporations and Associations, (1933) 48 Stat. 259, (1936) 12 U. S.
C. A. sees. 1131e-d; Joint Stock Land Banks (1916) 39 Stat. 374, (1936)
12 U. S. C. A. sees. 811-823; Federal Credit Unions (1934) 48 Stat. 1216,
(1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 1751-1752; Federal Savings and Loan Corpora-
tions (1933) 48 Stat. 132, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1464. On a functional
basis classification is more hazardous. Many treatises dealing solely with
the activities of the corporations will undoubtedly soon make their appear-
ances. Much literature dealing with the problem generally has already been
published. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1937); Van
Dorn, op. cit. supra, note 9; Dimock, op. cit. supra, note 18; Field, Govern-
ment Corporations: A Proposal (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 775; McDiarmid,
Government Corporations and Federal Funds (1937) 31 Amer. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 1094; McIntire, Government Corporations as Administrative Agencies
(1936) 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 161; Wehle, Government Controlled Business
Corporations (1935) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 94; Pinney, Government Commercial
Corporations (1937) 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 481.
20. Holmes, J., in Clallam County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S.
341, 345: "The incorporation [of a government-owned corporation] and
formal erection of a new personality was only for the convenience of the
United States to carry out its ends."
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planted to a large extent by the role of officialdom as the director
of activities. 21 The mushroom growth of government corpora-
tions, designed to advance relief and reconstruction, has required
a revealingly high investment, of $5,211,033,941.14 of goverm-
ment money.2 2 By June 30, 1937, the amount was only slightly
reduced.23
Among the states the corporation has had a less exciting his-
tory. State-owned banks are the oldest type of state-owned cor-
poration which still persists. 24 The twentieth century has wit-
nessed state-owned corporations operating toll roads, bridges,
and transportation systems. Of the latter, the most notable and
enviable examples are the Port of New York Authority25 and
the Boston Elevated Railway.2'
The mere ownership of stock by a government in a corpora-
tion does not metamorphose the corporation into a hybrid organ-
ization deserving unique treatment.27 The persuasive considera-
tion is the activities the corporation performs. Essentially the
function of government-owned corporations is largely one of
administration and falls within the orbit of administrative law
and those common law rules that apply to American govern-
mental administration generally. 2 Clearly the fundamental char-
21. United States News, Aug. 13, 1934, p. 5: 4.
22. Annual Report of United States Treasury (1936).
23. As of June 30, 1937, the Treasury held securities in the amount of
$4,837,172,459.95 in the corporations considered in this report. Annual
Report of the United States Treasury (1937) 449-50. This total is divided
as follows: Reconstruction Finance Corporation (exclusive of sum disbursed
to other government corporations), $3,303,389,546.17; Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, $125,000,000; Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion, $100,000,000; Federal Home Loan Banks, $120,514,000; Regional Agri-
cultural Credit Corporations, $15,000,000; Federal Farm Mortgage Cor-
poration, $200,000,000; Export-Import Bank, $21,000,000; R. F. C. Mort-
gage Corporation, $25,000,000; Disaster Loan Corporation, $6,000,000; Pro-
duction Credit Corporation, $120,000,000; Commodity Credit Corporation,
$100,000,000; Electric Home and Farm Authority, $850,000; Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Ass'n, $48,183,700; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
$150,000,000; Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, $10,000; Fed-
eral Land Banks, $262,225,213.78; Federal Intermediate Credit Banks,
$100,000,000; Central Bank for Cooperatives, $50,000,000; and Banks for
Cooperatives, $90,000,000. The Treasury Report for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1938, has not been published at this writing.
24. United States v. Planters' Bank (1825) 9 Wheat. 904.
25. N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 32: 1-66, 90, 113, 131; N. Y. Laws of
1925, c. 210, sec. 7; N. Y. Laws of 1926, c. 761, sec. 7; N. Y. Laws of 1927,
c. 300, sec. 7.
26. Mass. Special Acts of 1918, c. 159.
27. 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed. 1886) sec. 3.
28. Field, Government Corporations: A Proposal (1935) 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 775, 783.
1938]
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acteristics of a private corporation-the group of persons with
mutual interests, their voluntary combination, their common
search for gain-are not present. What we have is really a
public agency created by the legislature, forming a part of the
government, and managed by persons who are servants of the
state. A government-owned corporation is an instrumentality
established in order to render a particular service .2  As such it
is necessarily a legal hybrid.30
I
The most fervent enthusiasts of the advent of government-
owned corporations are less jubilant when faced with realization
of the harsh effect which the expansion of one government's eco-
nomic activity has upon the tax revenue of other governments.
It is axiomatic that as the proportion of tax-free properties in-
creases, the burden of the charges which must be levied against
the general taxpayer becomes proportionally heavier.3 1 Today
both national and state governments are faced with the necessity
of raising increasingly larger amounts of revenue. At the same
time there is a need that they enlarge the number and scope of
their activities. As the latter need is accomplished, the former
becomes more difficult to obtain.
From the standpoint of both policy and law, the relation of
the government corporation to the doctrine of the immunity of
federal instrumentalities from state taxation presents perplexing
problems. The purchase of millions of dollars of property, the
issuance of billions in securities, the employment of thousands
of persons, et cetera, have placed millions in revenue beyond the
reach of the state.3 2 The time is propitious to discuss the relation
between the contemporary movement toward corporateness and
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.324
29. Thurston, Government and Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 Va.
L. Rev. 465, 498-499.
30. For the purposes of this paper the constitutionality of the corpora-
tions will be presumed. See McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheaton 316;
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 180; Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) 297 U. S. 288; Baltimore National
Bank v. Tax Comm. (1936) 297 U. S. 209; United States v. Kay (1938)
58 S. Ct. 468; Culp, Creation of Government Corporations by the National
Government (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 473.
31. Moulton, Income and Economic Progress (1936) 99.
32. Rohlfing, et al., Business and Government (1935) 237-240.
32a. Attacks made against the doctrine by legal savants in by-gone
years are dwarfed by the recent agitation which has descended upon the
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When in 1916, the Federal Farm Loan Act, which provided
for the incorporation of the federal land banks, was being de-
bated, numerous senators, including the later Mr. Justice Suther-
land, vigorously denounced the provision extending tax-exemp-
tion privileges to the corporations, on the grounds of both policy
and legality2 3 In the debates creating the many New Deal cor-
porations, with one notable exception, 34 the congressmen voiced
little or no objection to granting tax-exemption privileges to the
new organizations.3 5
The typical provision exempts from state taxation the fran-
chises, capital, reserve, surplus, and income of corporations and
the principal and interest of all notes, debentures, bonds or other
obligations, except as to surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift
taxes. The states are, however, given the power to tax the realty
of the corporations to the same extent as other real property is
taxed. There are some variations from the typical formula. In
the case of the production credit corporations, production credit
associations, banks for cooperatives, and central banks, Congress
now politically-important principle in avalanche-like proportions. See Presi-
dent Roosevelt's Message to 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., April 25, 1938, reprinted
in N. Y. Times, April 26, 1938, p. 2: 3; Sen. Res. 303, 75th Cong., 3d.
Sess. (1938); Magill, Interview by Cotten, Washington Post, Sept. 11,
1938, p. 4B: 1; Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondhold-
ers and Employees: The Immunity Rule and The Sixteenth Amendment
(1938). We have already been warned that the 16th Amendment might
receive an interpretation which would effectively end the states' immunity
from federal taxation. See Black, J., concurring in Helvering v. Gerhardt
(1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 977. The federal government is probably ready to
waive its immunity from state taxation. See President Roosevelt's Mes-
sage to 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., supra.
33. (1916) 53 Cong. Rec. 6963, 6966, 7021, 7245, 7305, 7317, 7372.
34. Section 13 of the T. V. A. Act directs the Authority to pay state
taxes based upon a percentum of gross proceeds derived from the sale of
power generated at certain dams in Tennessee and Alabama. During the
period 1933-1937, inclusive, the Authority paid to the two states a total
tax of $175,217.22. Letter of Mr. W. L. Sturdevant, Director of Informa-
tion. July 22. 1938.
35. The following corporations enjoy tax-exemption privileges in one
form or another: Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority, Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, Federal
Home Loan Bank. Federal Savings and Loan Associations, Farmers' Home
Corporation, Federal Land Bank, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Na-
tional Farm Loan Association, National Mortgage Association, United
States Housing Authority, Commodity Credit Corporation, Production Credit
Corporation, Central Bank for Cooperatives, Production Credit Assciations,
Banks for Cooperatives, Crop Insurance Corporation, Federal Prison In-
dustries, Inc., Inland Waterways Corporation, Panama Railroad Co., Alaska
Railroad Co.
1938l
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has provided that the personalty as well as the realty of the
organizations be subject to non-discriminatory state taxation. 3
This is to be contrasted with the provision in the Federal Farm
Loan Act which exempts from state taxation first mortgages
executed to federal land banks and joint stock land banks,"
while granting to the states the right to tax realty acquired by
the corporations through the foreclosure of securities. 5 Banks
organized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to re-
place defunct institutions are exempt from all taxation.39 In the
housing field, it has been customary to include a provision that
all of the property shall be completely tax-exempt, qualified by
a provision giving the corporate agency authority to "enter into
agreements to pay annual sums in lieu of taxes to any State or
political subdivision thereof" which do not exceed the taxes that
would be paid upon such property if it were not tax exempt.40
Of the privately owned federally-incorporated and -controlled
corporations only one fails to enjoy the privilege of tax-exemp-
tion.41.
II
The plethora of literature on the problems of intergovern-
mental tax immunity serves but to demonstrate the umbrageous
bounds of this doctrine which rests only upon "necessary impli-
cation. 414 It was the country's first policy-shaping Chief Jus-
36. (1933) 48 Stat. 267, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1138c.
37. The provision has been ruled constitutional. (1917) 31 Ops. Att'y
Gen. 103.
38. The policy behind this provision seems clear. It would be working
at cross purposes to withdraw the property from the taxrolls by fore-
closure and increase the taxes on other borrowers in the same community.
39. Sec. 12B (1) (9) of Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 696.
40. E. g., sec. 13(c) of United States Housing Act (1937) 50 Stat. 888,(1938 Supp.) 42 U. S. C. A. sees. 1401-1402. See also (1936) 49 Stat.
2025, (1938 Supp.) 40 U. S. C. A. sec. 421; (1936) 49 Stat. 2035, (1938
Supp.) 40 U. S. C. A. see. 431. The Federal Subsistence Homesteads Cor-
poration exercised similar authority. (1934) 38 Ops. Att'y Gen. 2. This
is simply a statutory enactment of the policy pursued by the war-time
United States Housing Corporation. Van Dorn, Government Owned Cor-
porations (1926) 348-349.
41. Sec. 18 of Federal Credit Union Act. (1934) 48 Stat. 1216, (1936)
12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1751. The National Mortgage Associations, chartered
by the Federal Housing Administrator under the National Housing Act
(1934) 48 Stat. 1246, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. see. 1702, were subject to all
state taxation until Feb. 3, 1938, when see. 307 of the Act was amended
and the tax-exempt privilege extended. Pub. No. 424, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938).
41a. Nelson, J., in Collector v. Day (1871) 11 Wallace 113.
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tice-John Marshall-lb-who is to be credited with or blamed for
"discovering" the doctrine. It was he who in his short treatise
on general political theories42 found "a principle which so en-
tirely pervades the Constitution, is so intermixed with the mate-
rials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended
with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it,
without rending it into shreds."
In 1791 the first Congress passed an act incorporating the
Bank of the United States,'4 calling for a private stock corpora-
tion with power to establish branches and to engage in a general
banking business. The federal government was to purchase two
million of the ten million dollars capital. In 1811, before the
legality of the measure was adjudicated, the bank's charter auto-
matically expired and owing to political reasons was not re-
newed. In 1816, Congress incorporated the Second Bank of the
United States,4 4 the government to purchase seven million of the
thirty-five million dollars capital. The bank was constituted a
depository of the government, and given the power to engage
in a general banking business and establish branches. Branches
were established in many states, including Maryland, which in
1818 passed "An Act to impose a tax on all banks or branches
thereof in the State of Maryland not chartered by the state legis-
lature." The bank refusing to pay the tax, the state brought suit
against McCulloch, treasurer of the bank.
The able counsels' arguments were directed to the issue of
whether a state could completely frustrate an activity of the
federal government within its territory. The issue was crucial;
eight states had already enacted laws designed to expel the bank
or seriously hamper its operations.45 Under the circumstances,
then, the Chief Justice, after sustaining the federal government's
41b. "He [Marshall] gave to the Constitution of the United States the
impress of his own mind; and the form of our constitutional law is what
it is, because he moulded it while it was still plastic and malleable in the
fire of his own intense convictions." Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial
Process (1921) 151.
42. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheaton 316.
43. (1791) 1 Stat. 191.
44. (1816) 3 Stat. 266, sec. 7 read: "That the subscribers to the said
bank of the United States of America, their successors, and assigns, shall
be and are hereby, created a corporation and body politic, by the name and
style of 'The President, directors, and company, of the Bank of the United
States.' * * * ,"
45. 1 Warren, The Supreme Court (1935) 505-6.
19381
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power to create a corporation,46 was faced with the necessity of
shaping an opinion which would effectively protect an important
federal policy from annihilation at the hands of the dissident
states. Holding the tax invalid was only half the task; starting
the Constitution working was the more important phase of his
job47 Embarking upon an excursion of words, the Chief Justice
announced that the states have no power to retard, impede, bur-
den, or in any manner control the operations of the national
government. That taxation was or at least could be a weapon
to so interfere, he thought undeniable.48 Clearly Chief Justice
Marshall regarded the doctrine as applicable irrespective of the
type of activity which the instrumentality pursued, or of the
possibly divergent purpose of the state tax.49 He regarded the
very attempt of a state to tax the means employed by the federal
government as "itself an abuse" 50 because the usurpation of a
power which the people of a single state could not give. The
Chief Justice was ever-conscious of that "great principle" that
"the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are
supreme; that they control the Constitution and laws of the
respective states, and cannot be controlled by them."''
Five years later, in Osborn v. United States Ban7,52 Chief
Justice Marshall reinforced his earlier expression. The case
arose under an Ohio law, enacted "for the avowed purpose of
expelling the Bank from the State" and imposing an annual tax
of $50,000 for the privilege of doing business in the state. The
act authorized the state official to distrain in the event the tax
was not paid. The bank sued to enjoin the state official from
proceeding under the act, and the appropriate injunction was
issued. Despite this decree the state official ordered his deputy
to collect the tax. The deputy in turn proceeded to the office of
the bank and took therefrom $100,000 in specie and bank notes.
46. (1819) 4 Wheaton 316, 407, 408, 411.
47. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 268.
48. For " * * * the power to tax involves the power to destroy." 4
Wheat. at 327, 427, 431. Therefore " * * * that the power to destroy may
defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repug-
nance, in conferring on one government a power to control the constitu-
tional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very mea-
sures, is declared to be the supreme over that which exerts the control, are
propositions not to be denied." Id. at 431.
49. 4 Wheaton at 432.
50. Id. at 430.
51. Id at 429. Cf. U. S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
52. (1824) 9 Wheaton 738.
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The bank sued to recover this money and to enjoin the state
officials from further proceeding under the act. The opinion, in
substance reaffirming the McCulloch decision in holding the tax
unlawful, is further important as an ex post facto explanation
of the basis for the McCulloch decision. Here we find the Chief
Justice speaking as though the immunity rested upon the will of
Congress rather than upon constitutional compulsion.5 3
In both cases the court was confronted with a discriminatory
tax. ' Marshall, though, addressing himself to a problem larger
than that in fact presented, used language applicable to non-
discriminatory as well as discriminatory taxes. Throughout the
opinions we find him speaking of "supremacy," a concept reiter-
ated by his later statements.
Marshall's "total failure" stage has for the most part been
limited to that early period in our history when the nation and
the states were potentially, if not actually, hostile sovereigns.
When, however, we entered a period of assumed friendly rela-
tions and common purposes ;518 when the Court agreed that where
the exercise of the right is lawful, the courts may not prevent
its exercise because of the fear that it may, if indiscriminately
extended, lead to disastrous results ;57 when an eminent author-
ity pointed to the fallaciousness of the "power to tax is the power
to destroy" argument ;5S the court dismissed this mechanical ap-
plication for a more rational principle which gave full recogni-
tion to actualities. 5
53. Id. at 865, 868.
54. Even the most vitriolic opponents of the immunity agree that a dis-
criminatory tax is invalid. For cases declaring a discriminatory tax invalid
see Pelton v. Commercial Bank of Cleveland (1830) 101 U. S. 143; Boyer
v. Boyer (1885) 113 U. S. 689; Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania (1936)
296 U. S. 113.
55. Weston v. Charleston (1829) 2 Peters 449, 466.
56. Dowling, Cheatham, and Hale, Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitu-
tion (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 351, 357.
57. Knowlton v. Moore (1900) 178 U. S. 41; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
(1911) 220 U. S. 107, 169.
58. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 321. Cf. the statement of
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox (1928) 277
U. S. 218, 223: "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this
Court sits."
59. Educational Film Corp. v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379; Fox Film
Corp. v. Doval (1932) 286 U. S. 123. Cf. Peckham, J., in Nicol v. Ames
(1898) 173 U. S. 509, 516: "Taxation is eminently practical, and is in fact
brouvht to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its
validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, rather
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Since the Court now views a tax in light of its "consequence
to the operations of government," this must necessarily include
a consideration of the support of the taxing state.60 For the
power to tax is the right to "keep alive."0 1 Various criteria have
been advanced: the tax may not be direct ;02 may not interfere
with the efficient performance of governmental functions ;63 may
not affect governmental efficiency.64 Moreover, it has been said
that the immunity extends only to functions which are strictly,G
essentially,60 usually,6 7 or traditionally68 governmental. The diffi-
culty with these norms is that they permit the mind to wander
afield" and consider matters having no relation to the problem
of whether a governmental activity of the taxed sovereign is
being subjected to "undue harm,"70 which comes close to being a
test of quantum.7 1 The decisions defy any symmetrical plan; the
boundaries of the doctrine are shaped by no ineluctable logic.
In another respect the doctrine has changed from that an-
nounced by Chief Justice Marshall. There is nothing in MoCul-
lock v. Maryland to indicate that Marshall believed that the
states enjoyed rights corresponding to the federal immunity from
state taxation. In fact, he addressed himself to the argument
that any principle that would sustain their subsumed right of
the federal government to tax state banks would at the same
than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness
is the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who are experts
in the science of political economy."
60. Cf. James v. Dravo Construction Co. (1937) 58 S. Ct. 208; South
Carolina v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437; Chase, C. J., in Thomson
v. Union Pacific R. R. (1869) 9 Wallace 579, 591; Hughes, C. J., in Helver-
ing v. Mountain Products Corp. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 623.
61. Mr. Justice Peckham in Nicol v. Ames (1899) 173 U. S. 509, 515.
62. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 524.
63. National Bank v. Commonwealth (1869) 9 Wallace 353, 362.
64. Helvering v. Powers (1935) 293 U. S. 214, 255.
65. South Carolina v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 461.
66. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 172.
67. Helvering v. Powers (1934) 293 U. S. 214, 225.
68. United States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175, 184.
69. Watkins, The Power of the State and Federal Governments to Tax
One Another (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 475, 501.
70. Dowling, Cheatham, and Hale, supra, note 56, at 353-357; Note
(1937) 12 St. John's L. Rev. 81.
71. Cf. James v. Dravo Construction Co. (1937) 58 S. Ct. 208. Contra:
Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 570, 575: "Where
the principle [of intergovernmental tax immunity] applies it is not affected
by the amount of the particular tax or the extent of the resulting inter-
ference, but is absolute." Trinity Farm Construction Co. v. Grosjean (1933)
291 U. S. 466, 471,
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time sustain the right of the states to tax national banks, and
expressly rejected the parallel. 7 2 Then in 1869 Chief Justice
Chase, in Texas v. White,73 casually mentioned that we were "an
indestructible Union composed of indestructible states." When
this utterance was made, it is probably fair to say that the Chief
Justice had no idea it would be relied upon to furnish an "in-
destructible" principle of taxation, making every rule of tax im-
munity applicable to the federal government applicable also to
the states. From 1871, when Mr. Justice Nelson referred in
Collector v. Day74 to the principle of "equality," until May, 1938,
such judicial utterances as there were seemed to support the
proposition that the doctrine of the immunity of federal instru-
mentalities from state taxation extended to the states a corre-
sponding immunity of their instrumentalities from federal tax-
ation.'s
III
Occasionally the federal government, unlike state govern-
ments, has waived its immunity and permitted the states to
impose non-discriminatory taxes upon federal instrumentalities. 78
Its right to do so is unmistakably clear.77 The most notable ex-
72. "But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all
the States have created the general government. The people of all the
States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by
their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered
institutions of the States, they tax their constituents; and these taxes
must be uniform." (1819) 4 Wheaton at 435.
But he continued: "When a State taxes the operations of the govern-
ment of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their
constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon
measures of a government created by others as well as themselves, for
the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference is that
which always exists, and always must exist, between the action of the
whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole-between the laws
of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government which,
when in opposition to those laws is not supreme." Id. at 436. Cf. Bradley,
J., dissenting in Railroad Co. v. Penniston (1875) 85 U. S. 5, 48.
73. (1869) 7 Wallace 700.
74. (1871) 11 Wallace 113. The conclusion was not wholly unexpected.
It had been hinted by Clifford, J., in Provident Savings Institution v.
Massachusetts (1868) 6 Wallace 594, 638-9.
75. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 523-4; Willcuts
v. Bunn (1931) 282 U. S. 216; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States
(1932) 283 U. S. 570; Helvering v. Powers (1935) 293 U. S. 214; United
States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175, 185; Brush v. Commissioner(1937) 300 U. S. 352; James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1937) 58 S. Ct.
208, 231; Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and
State Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 807.
76. (1918) 40 Stat. 458, (1928) 43 U. S. C. A. secs. 337-8 (consenting
to state taxation of railroads during government operation).
77. Van Allen v. The Assessors (1865) 3 Wallace 573, 583, 585.
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ample has been in authorizing the states to tax national banks. 8
Since 1864'7 the states have been permitted to impose a general
tax on the shares of stock in national banks.
When, in 1933,80 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was
authorized to lend money to banks on preferred stock of the
borrowing institution, the problem was presented whether these
shares were taxable in the hands of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. One statute provided that "all" shares of a na-
tional bank were taxable. Another statute extended to the Re-
construction Finance Corporation general tax-emption privileges.
A lower federal court and the Maine Supreme Court regarded
the latter statute as controlling and held the tax improper as a
tax on a federal instrumentality.8' The Maryland Supreme Court
held the tax valid on the basis that the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation was not entitled to the benefit of the government's
tax immunity because not engaged in an essential governmental
function.8 2 On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the judgment
in the Maryland case83 without, however, affirming the reasoning.
The Supreme Court found the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion to be acting in furtherance of a governmental activity"4 but
sustained the state tax on the ground that Congress had removed
the barrier against state taxation." The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, therefore, was to be regarded as any other stock-
holder .8  Subsequently a bill to make the stock of national banks
78. Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 564; Iowa-
'Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett (1931) 284 U. S. 239; Note (1931)
17 ST. Louis LAW REVIEW 38.
79. (1864) 13 Stat. 99, 112.
80. (1933) 48 Stat. 5, 6, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. see. 51a-d, as amended
(1933) 48 Stat. 20, 21, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 51d.
81. United States v. Lewis (W. D. Ky. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 471; Opinion
of the Justices (Me. 1935) 177 Atl. 897.
82. State Tax Commission v. Baltimore National Bank (1935) 169 Md.
65, 180 Atl. 260, cert. granted (1935) 296 U. S. 538.
83. Baltimore National Bank v. Tax Commission (1936) 297 U. S. 209.
84. Id. at 211.
85. It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that an act whose
terms are specific is to be construed as an exception to one more general
in terms. Kepner v. United States (1904) 195 U. S. 100, 125; Townsend v.
Little (1883) 109 U. S. 504, 512. It seems, then, that the Court's view that
the act creating the R. F. C. and granting to it immunity from taxation
was not intended to preclude the operation of the earlier act withdrawing
the immunity from national bank shares is correct. See Comment (1936)
,84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793.
86. Shares of stock of a national bank held by another national bank
are taxable. Bank v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 69-70; Bank of California
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acquired by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation exempt
from state taxation was passed.87 In the light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.8 8 the
right of Congress to exempt these shares from state taxation
seems indisputable.
In many states, statutes provide that no mortgage may be
filed or received in evidence in any proceeding, on which a mort-
gage registration fee has not been paid. The general counsel
of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation ruled, shortly after the
corporation was organized, that mortgages taken over by the
corporation are exempt from state mortgage recording taxes.,,
The Supreme Court had earlier declared this to be the law where
the federal act expressly made the mortgages federal instru-
mentalities. 0 Some states passed laws expressly exempting the
federal lending agencies from the operation of this requirement,9
while in other states the result was reached by holding that the
statute could not constitutionally apply because it would amount
to a tax on a federal instrumentality.92
IV
State incorporation of federal-owned corporations has given
rise to legal as well as political questions. From the taxation
v. Richardson (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 483; Des Moines National Bank v.
Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S. 103.
87. The bill was originally introduced in Congress immediately follow-
ing the decision upholding the state tax. The measure passed the Senate
but was defeated in the House by a narrow margin. N. Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1936, p. 1: 4. The measure was reintroduced and was subjected to vigor-
ous debate. See 80 Cong. Rec. 4041 et seq. (March 19, 1936). Representa-
tive Patman denounced the act as a "banker's bonus bill" (at p. 4062).
Representative Hancock was of the opinion that the towns gained more
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation saving their banks than from
taxes (at p. 4045). The bill passed on March 20, 1936. 49 Stat. 1185,
(1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 51d.
88. (1921) 255 U. S. 180, 211: "Deciding, as we do, that these institu-
tions have been created by Congress within the exercise of its legitimate
authority, we think the power to make the securities here involvd tax exempt
necessarily follows."
89. (193) 1 U. S. Law Week 116.
90. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Crosland (1923) 261 U. S.
374, rev'g (1922) 207 Ala. 456. The court reached this conclusion even
though the land bank could compel the borrower to reimburse it for the tax.
91. See, for example, N. Y. Laws of 1933 (Ex. Sess.) c. 785. Held con-
stitutional in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Barbone (Sup. Ct. 1937)
164 Misc. 187, 298 N. Y. S. 531.
92. Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Anderson (1937) 145 Kansas
209, 64 P. (2d) 14; Ops. Att'y Gen. of Pa. (1935-1936) No. 176, p. 55(reversing an earlier ruling).
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angle it is clear that the incorporating state may exact such
general incorporation fees as it levies against all other corpora-
tions.93 May such a corporation do business in other states un-
qualifiedly? In only one instance has a state attempted to restrict
this right. Maryland sought to collect its usual foreign corpora-
tion qualifying tax from the Electric Home and Farm Authority,
incorporated in Delaware and later under the laws of the District
of Columbia. " The Comptroller General, however, ruled such an
exaction unauthorized because the Authority was "an instru-
mentality of the United States."9 5 If that is so, certainly a cor-
poration created by statute should not be required to pay an
entrance fee in order to do business within a state. Such author-
ity as there is on this problem so holds.,8 While the Supreme
Court has sustained a federal tax on a corporate franchise
granted by a state,97 it has denied the states the right to levy
a tax on a franchise granted by Congress."s Recently, a state
tax on the equivalent of a federal franchise was sustained",
where there was no exemption expressly provided. Where, as
in the case of the government corporations, Congress has ex-
pressly provided against state taxation of a federally-granted
'"franchise," it is doubtful that the Court would sustain such a
tax. A patent and a copyright are held for private gain; govern-
ment corporations are not profit-making agencies; they are in-
strumentalities through which the government performs its func-
tions.
93. Delaware, where most of the state-chartered federal-owned corpora-
tions were chartered, waived payment of the usual incorporation taxes;
charged only nom~inal fees for services actually rendered, such as the filing
of the application and the issuing of certificates; waived the annual fran-
chise taxes; and charged only a nominal fee for the filing of the annual
report. Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and their Legal Problems(1936) 14 N. C. L. Rev. 337, 349. See also letter of Comptroller General
McCarl reprinted in 78 Cong. Rec. 1053 (Jan. 22, 1934).
94. (1935) 95 Baltimore Daily Record 1.
95. (1936) Compt. Gen. Dec. No. A-71363.
96. Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Statelen (Wash. 1937) 70 P. (2d)
1053.
97. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107.
98. California v. Central Pacific R. R. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 1. But a
few years later the Court, over the dissents of Justices Field and Harlan,
permitted the state to tax the value of the state franchise of the railroad.
The dissenters thought that the two franchises, under which the railroad
operated, were so blended together as to defy separate evaluation. Central
Pacific R. R. v. California (1896) 162 U. S. 91.
99. Education Film Corp. v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379; Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal (1932) 286 U. S. 123.
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V
With the government-owned corporations holding vast amounts
of property and with the Attorney General advising the corpora-
tions to resist all taxes10 except those which they are expressly
authorized to pay, it becomes important to consider the law relat-
ing to state taxation of property owned by federal-owned cor-
porations. °'0
The first official opinion that there rests no power in a state
to tax the property of the United States situated within its
borders was in 1806.11 In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall, in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,102 casually announced the dictum, 10 3 which
he repeated in Osborn v. United States,0 4 that the local property
of the United States Bank could be taxed by the state of Mary-
land. It remained for a later opinion of Marshall's to clarify this
statement. In Weston v. Charleston10 5 he said that property "ac-
quired by the corporation" would be taxable by the state. The
original property of the instrumentality was not then subject to
state taxation, but only the property which it acquired in the
course of its dealings. Save for two unreported cases, 10 6 the
Court has consistently held that no state can tax property of the
100. (1934) 38 Ops. Att'y Gen. 2.
100a. There is no need to discuss this problem from the viewpoint of
state-owned corporations since the federal government is, owing to the
requirement of the apportionment of direct taxes, unable effectively to
levy a property tax.
101. (1806) 1 Ops. Att'y Gen. 157.
102. (1819) 4 Wheaton 316.
103. Id. at 436-437.
104. (1824) 9 Wheaton 738, 867.
105. Weston v. Charleston (1829) 2 Peters 449, 468.
106. United States v. Portland (1847), involving tax on land owned by
United States and used for custom house; evenly divided court on a certifi-
cation from Circuit Court remanded the case, but Maine repealed the law
and so case never came up again; Roach v. Philadelphia County, where
tax on building of United States Mint was sustained by the Pennsylvania
courts, and affirmed by an equal division of opinion in the Supreme Court.
These two cases are mentioned in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (1886) 117
U. S. 151, 175, 176.
Originally the Court held invalid the attempts of a. state to assess an
ad valorem tax to the lessee of Indian land on ores extracted from the
land but before sale and before the equitable interests of the Indians had
been paid. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir (1926) 271 U. S. 609. But where
the lessee of Indian land had extracted oil and stored it in his own tanks,
the Court held that a state might lawfully levy an ad valorem tax. Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization (1933) 288 U. S.
325; Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. (1937) 300 U. S. 1
(ad valorem tax on equipment employed in drilling for oil and gas). Cf.
British American Oil Producing Co. v. Montana (1936) 299 U. S. 159.
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United States without consent, 107 nor property which the United
States has sold until the government has parted with legal and
equitable title. 08
Does this same immunity apply when title to the property is
in the name of a corporation? The Supreme Court, with defer-
ence to the state's need for revenue, early held that a state might
lawfully tax property of a private corporation engaged in per-
forming duties imposed on it by Congress where Congress had
not expressly provided that it be tax-exempt. 00 There is, a7s
Chief Justice Chase said, "a clear distinction between the means
employed by the government and the property of agents em-
ployed by the government." 10 His recognition that a different
conclusion would apply to federal instrumentalities created for
constitutional ends' foreshadowed the later rebuffs by the
courts of every attempt on the part of states to tax property of
107. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (1886) 117 U. S. 151; Wisconsin, etc.,
R. R. v. Price County (1890) 133 U. S. 496; Lee v. Osceola Improvement
District (1925) 268 U. S. 643; United States v. Hoboken (D. C. D. N. J.
1928) 29 F. (2d) 932; (1911) 28 Ops. Att'y Gen. 604; Do La Vergne
Machine Co. v. Commission (1925) 211 App. Div. 227, 207 N. Y. S. 680,
aff'd (1925) 241 N. Y. 517, 150 N. E. 536.
108. New Brunswick v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 547; Railroad
Co. v. Prescott (1872) 16 Wall. 603; R. R. v. McShane (1874) 22 Wall.
444; Railroad Co. v. Traill County (1885) 115 U. S. 600; Tucker v.
Ferguson (1875) 22 Wall. 527; United States v. Rickert (1903) 188 U. S.
432; Irwin v. Wright (1922) 258 U. S. 219; Lincoln County v. Pacific
Spruce Corp. (C. C. A. 9, 1928) 26 F. (2d) 435, aff'g (D. C. D. Ore.
1927) 21 F. (2d) 586; Port Angeles Western R. R. v. Clallam County(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 202; United States v. Milwaukee
(D. C. E. D. Wis. 1893) 100 Fed. 828; Philadelphia v. Meyers (1931) 102
Pa. Super. 424, 157 Atl. 13; Mint Realty Co. v. Philadelphia (1907) 218
Pa. 104, 66 AtI. 1130; Copp v. State (1911) 69 W. Va. 444, 71 S. E. 580.
But the state may tax the purchaser's interest in the land. Port Angeles
Western R. R. v. Clallam County (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1930) 36 F. (2d)
956, aff'd (C. C. A. 9, 1931) 44 F. (2d) 28, cert. denied (1931) 283 U. S.
848; New Brunswick v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 547, 556, modifying
(C. C. A. 3, 1926) 11 F. (2d) 476.
109. Thomson v. Pacific R. R. (1869) 9 Wall. 579 (1869) Railroad Co.
v. Peniston (1873) 18 Wall. 5; Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Baltimore (1904) 195 U. S. 375 (1904); Alward v. Johnson (1931) 282
U. S. 509; Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission of Maryland
(1931) 283 U. S. 291; Choctaw, etc., R. R. v. Mackey (1921) 256 U. S. 531;
Thomas v. Gay (1898) 169 U. S. 264. The same rule applies to privately
owned property under the control of the United States through the exercise
of war power, see St. Louis, etc., Ry. v. Middlekamp (1920) 256 U. S. 226,
and to property under the control of officers of the United States courts by
virtue of receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. Stevens v. New York
& 0. M. R. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,405; Swartz
v. Hammer (1904) 194 U. S. 441.
110. In Thomson v. Pacific R. R. (1869) 9 Wall. 579, 591.
111. Id. at 590.
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wholly government-owned but state-incorporated corporations.",2
The reasoning of all the last-cited cases was essentially the same:
first, taxation of the property is not necessarily taxation of the
means, except where property is itself the only means and instru-
mentality by which the federal purpose can be performed; sec-
ond, property does not lose its public character merely because
the government chooses for its own convenience to have legal
title taken in the name of a corporation, which it brings into
existence and completely controls.
These decisions, all on war-time corporations, rest heavily on
the fact that the corporations were utilized to facilitate prose-
cution of the war. Only one case has arisen from the attempt
of a state to tax the property of a peace-time government cor-
poration." 3 A similar result obtained, but it is not clear whether
the decision rests chiefly on the implied immunity which
prompted the conclusions in the cases concerned with the War-
time corporations, or whether the court was merely giving effect
to the statute declaring the corporation exempt from state excise
taxes.
VI
Insofar as the doctrine of inter-governmental tax immunity
grants an exemption to state or federal employees from taxation
of their salaries by the other government, it is the least satis-
factory segment of the anachronistic tenet.
Since 1842, when the Court in Dobbins v. Commissioner-4 held
it unlawful for a state to tax the office of a captain in the United
States revenue-cutter service, it has been generally accepted that
a state may not tax the salary of an employee of the federal
government.
112. United States Spruce Production Corporation: Clallam County v.
United States Spruce Production Corporation (1923) 263 U. S. 341; United
State Spruce Production Corporation v. Lincoln County (D. C. D. Ore.
1922) 285 Fed. 388; Lincoln County v. Pacific Spruce Corp. (C. C. A. 9,
1929) 26 F. (2d) 4.35. Emerzencv Fleet Corporation: United States v.
Coughlin (D. C. D. Md. 1919) 261 Fed. 425; King County v. U. S. Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corp. (C. C. A. 9, 1922) 282 Fed. 950; U. S.
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Delaware County (C. C.
A. ,. 1928) 17 F. (2d) 40. aff'd on rehearing (C. C. A. 3, 1928) 25 F. (2d)
722, appeal dismissed (1927) 275 U. S. 483, cert. denied (1928) 278 U. S.
607. United States Housing Corporation: Brunswick v. United States
(1928) 279 U. S. 547; U. S. Housing Corp. v. Watertown (Sup. Ct. 1920)
113 Misc. 679, 186 N. Y. S. 309.
113. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Highway Dept. of South Caro-
lina (1933) 172 S. C. 174. 173 S. E. 284.
114. (1842) 16 Peters 435.
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Suppose the taxpayer is employed by a wholly government-
owned corporation? The general counsel of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation has ruled that the salaries of employees of the
corporation are not subject to state taxation.1 ' The Montana
Supreme Court, however, has sustained state taxation of the
salary of an employee of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion.1 8 The salary of an official of a federal land bank has been
held subject to taxation by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.",
The Kansas Supreme Court held the salary of a clerk employed
by corporations comprising the Wichita farm credit district1
subject to state income tax, not relying on any one ground but
announcing three bases: (1) the corporations are not engaged
in essential governmental functions; (2) the tax would not un-
duly interfere with the operations of the government, and (3)
Congress by failing to expressly exempt the salary of the em-
ployees of a corporation, while at the same time enumerating
other exemptions, indicated that it did not intend that the em-
ployees' salaries should be immune from state taxation.11
The Supreme Court has not as yet been called upon to deter-
mine whether the immunity extends to employees of the recently-
organized federal-owned corporations. While it is always hazard-
ous to predict the view which the court will follow, it does not
seem unreasonable to suggest that the Court will probably dis-
miss as unreal a distinction based upon the fact that the em-
ployees are technically employees of the corporations rather than
115. Ruling of June 10, 1936. The ruling is premised upon the uncon-
vincing reasoning that if a state were permitted to tax the employee's
salary, it would be necessary for the corporation to raise wages, and this
would burden and impede the corporation in the performance of govern-
mental functions.
116. Pomeroy v. State Board of Equalization (1935) 99 Mont. 534, 45
P. (2d) 316. The wholesome result is buttressed by unsound reasoning.
Matthews, J., speaking for the court was of the opinion that employees of
government-owned corporations were not entitled to the immunity enjoyed
by those government workers employed by government departments or agen-
cies. But the government regards the employees of both the corporations
and the agencies similarly in most respects. See (1936) 49 Stat. 1161,
(1938 Supp.) 5 U. S. C. A. secs. 29a, 31a, 30b, 30c, 30d (vacations and
sick leave); (1937) 50 Stat. 528, (1938 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1015
(compensation benefits); Exec. Order No. 6746, June 21, 1934; (1935) 49
Stat. 620, 639, 643, (1938 Supp.) 42 U. S. C. A. sees. 301-2, 1011, 1101-2,
1108-9 (both excluded from old-age benefits and unemployment insurance).
117. Parker v. State Tax Commission (Miss. 1937) 174 So. 567.
118. Federal Land Bank, Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, Production
Credit Corporation, and Bank for Cooperatives.
119. Clinton v. State Tax Commission (Kan. 1937) 71 P. (2d) 857.
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of the government. This prediction is not based upon surmise
alone. The Court has held immune from state taxation the salary
of an employee of the government-owned Panama Canal Rail-
road, which in addition to its railroad across the Isthmus of
Panama operates a steamship line, a commissary, a dairy, and
two hotels. 2
0
In Collector v. Day the Court ruled, over the dissent of Mr.
Justice Bradley, that the salary of a state judge was exempt
from federal taxation.1 21 The decision is one of the unhappy
aftermaths of the Civil War.'12 1 Insofar as the opinion proceeds
upon the premise of parity between the state and federal sover-
eigns, it is diametrically opposed to Marshall's concept of federal
supremacy announced in the vanguard case of McCulloch v.
Maryland. In 1871 the Court had not yet fully determined to
what extent the Civil War Amendments had enlarged the federal
power at the expense of the states. 22 Having witnessed the exer-
cise of the federal taxing power to destroy a state function,123
the Court was undoubtedly tacitly solicitous of the continued
existence of the states as governmental units. It may well be
that the Court looked askance at any endeavor to extend the
federal taxing power"14 to reach the salaries of officials engaged
in the performance of a function which pertained to state govern:-
ments at the time the Constitution was adopted and without
which no state could long preserve its orderly existence.
120. People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves (1936) 299 U. S. 401, rev'g (1936)
271 N. Y. 543, 2 N. E. (2d) 686; Comment (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 922.
It is noteworthy that in 1905 the Attorney General ruled that employees
of the Panama Railroad Company were not "employees of the United
States." (1905) 25 Ops. Att'y Gen. 465. The Court in the instant case
reasoned thus: The acquisition, construction, and maintenance of the Canal
was a proper exercise by Congress of its power to provide for the national
defense and regulation of commerce; the railroad is a cooperating auxiliary
of the Canal; therefore, the railroad company is a government instru-
mentality. So: " * * * the Railroad company being immune from state
taxation, it necessarily results that fixed salaries and compensation paid
to its officers and employees in their capacity as such are likewise immune."'
299 U. S. at 408. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, went on
to say: "The primary purpose of the enterprise being legitimately govern-
mental, its incidental use for private purposes affords no ground for ob-jection."
121. (1871) 11 Wall. 113.
121a. The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged this fact. See
Stone, J., in Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969.
122. Cf. Slaughterhouse Cases (1872) 16 Wall. 36.
123. Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533.
124. Cf. Lane County v. Oregon (1869) 7 Wall. 71, 76, 77; Slaughter-
house Cases (1873) 16 Wall. 36, 82.
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The doctrine of Collector v. Day has been more strictly applied
than that of Dobbins v. Commissioner. Often the Court would
say that the Day case was limited to instances where the em-
ployee was engaged in a function "usually" or "traditionally"
performed by the state. In two important cases the Court upheld
application of the federal income tax to the salaries of an adviser
to the state on water supply and sewage disposal125 and of em-
ployees of a state-owned corporation, the Boston Elevated Rail-
way. 126 In the spring of 1937 the Court seemed to make an
about-face. Over the vigorous protest of two dissenting and two
concurring justices, the majority held the salary of the chief
engineer of the Bureau of Water Supply of New York City not
subject to federal income tax,127 pointing to the important rela-
tion between the conservation and distribution of water supply
and the maintenance of health, disposal of sewage, fire protec-
tion, et cetera, in reaching the conclusion that the petitioner was
employed in connection with a purely governmental function.
If the ratio decidendi of the case was at all valid, it meant that
where a state or its political subdivision performed a service of
vital importance to the public, that service would be regarded
as an essential governmental function although the activity could
be and often was performed under the auspices of private capi-
tal. Surely the case rejected the argument that the immunity
extends only to employees performing functions traditionally
governmental.
With the change in personnel of the Court 28 came a change
in the judicial proclivity. Despite a favorable decision, 12 1 in
125. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514.
126. Helvering v. Powers (1934) 293 U. S. 214.
127. Brush v. Commissioner (1937) 300 U. S. 352. Mr. Justice Roberts
and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented upon the ground that where, as here,
the tax falls equally upon all employed in a like occupation, and the burden
of the tax on the state is uncertain, the constitutional principle of immunity
is inapplicable. Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo concurred in
the result only because they believed that the petitioner came within the
terms of the exemption prescribed by Treasury Reg. No. 74, art. 643. See
for an excellent comment (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 572.
See also comments (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 1019; (1937) 21 Minn. L. R.
866; (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 550.
128. Mr. Justice Black replaced Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr.
Justice Reed succeeded Mr. Justice Sutherland.
129. Helvering v. Therrell (1938) 303 U. S. 218, upholding the applica-
bility of the federal income tax to the salary of a state-appointed bank
liquidator, which salary was ultimately paid from the corporate assets of
the solvent bank. Cf. Lucas v. Reed (1930) 281 U. S. 699.
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which foreshadowing dicta went largely unnoticed, 130 few were
prepared for the opinion which Mr. Justice Stone rendered in
Helvering v. Gerhardt on May 23, 1938.131 Philip L. Gerhardt
was a salaried employee of the Port of New York Authority, a
non-stock bi-state corporation existing by virtue of congressional
authorization."; It engaged in the construction, operation, and
maintenance of transportation facilities within the Port of New
York district, which collects tolls, issues its own securities, and
has been a rather profitable undertaking. 3 " Relying upon ear-
lier rulings of the Board of Tax Appeals, 34 Gerhardt resisted
efforts to collect federal income tax on his salary, and the Board
of Tax Appeals and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained his position. Before the Supreme Court, the government
admitted the validity of the doctrine of Collector v. Day 35 but
sought to sustain the tax on other grounds .1 3  With unconven-
tional"' suddenness, the Court "overruled a century of prece-
dents"' 38 and held that the immunity doctrine did not exempt the
employee's salary from the federal income tax. 3  The decision
rests on two bases: first, the activities of the Port of New York
Authority are not considered essential to the state's continued
130. (1938) 303 U. S. at 223: "The United States may not tax instru-
mentalities which a state may employ in the discharge of her essential
governmental duties-that is those duties which the framers intended each
member of the union would assume in order adequately to function under
the form of government guaranteed by the Constitution."
131. (1938) 330 U. S. 630.
132. Pub. Res. No. 66, 67th Cong., H. S. Res. No. 337 (1922) 42 Stat.
822.
133. Seventeenth Annual Report (1937) 42.
134. Moissieff v. Comm. (1930) 21 B. T. A. 515; Carey v. Comm. (1934)
31 B. T. A. 839.
125. Transcript of Oral Argument, pp. 7-8.
136. Namely, that (1) the activities of the Port Authority were pro-,
prietary in nature, (2) the Port Authority was an agency not created by
the states alone, and (3) the Port Authority operates in interstate com-
merce, subject to the paramount power of Congress.
137. It is significant that in James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1938)
302 U. S. 134 and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm. (1938) 302 U. S. 186,
where the Court entertained doubts upon the immunity of income derived
by contractors from work for the United States, the cases were set down
for reargument, on the issue, before the previously-existing doctrine was
overruled.
1.18. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting. (1938)
5S S. Ct. at 980.
139. Mr. Justice Black concurred separately. He suggested that, since
the cases were irreconcilable, the entire subject of intergovernmental tax
immunity should be reexamined and considered in light of the Sixteenth
Amendment.
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existence as a government entity; second, even if the function
itself was immune, the burden on the state of a federal tax on
state employees "was too speculative and uncertain" to justify
the claimed immunity. After suggesting an unsatisfactory dis-
tinction of Brush v. Commissioner,891 the majority confessed
that the latter was "limited" by what was now said. Actually,
the Brush case was overruled. The decision attracted added at-
tention because it followed closely upon President Roosevelt's
pleaW' 0 for a "simple statute" permitting federal taxation of state
securities and the salaries of state employees, and permitting
state taxation of federal securities and the salaries of federal
employees.
The decision opens up a vast reservoir of revenue heretofore
regarded as immune from the federal income tax.141 It affords
some ground for a forthcoming declaration that the immunity
doctrine is not reciprocal.142 It denotes a tendency narrowly to
restrict the doctrine. It announces a new test of immunity, viz.,
that the federal government may tax any state function which is
"not one without which a state could not continue to exist as a
governmental entity." It abandons the postulate that any eco-
nomic burden that may be passed on to the state government and
thus increase the state's expenses is an unconstitutional exac-
tion.14 3
Judicial delimitation of the tax-exempt categories could best
begin with the salaries of government employees. Even if the
doctrine of immunity has some validity when applied to the tax-
ation directly of government instrumentalities, the taxing of the
salary of an employee cannot affect the activities which the state
or federal-owned corporations are designed to pursue.144 In the
139a. (1937) 300 U. S. 352. It is inaccurate to say that the Brush case
was a decision on the applicability of the Treasury Regulation. Only Mr.
Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo regarded it as such at the time.
Five members of the Court rested the decision on the constitutional basis.
140. Message to Congress on April 25, 1938. N. Y. Times, April 26,
1938, p. 1: 3.
141. It is unlikely that Congress will permit the Treasury Department
to assess back-taxes on the state employees affected by the Gerhardt deci-
sion. Cf. sec. 1211 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 130; and cf.
Cardozo, J., in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co. (1932)
287 U. S. 358, 365.
142. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 970-973.
143. Id. at 976.
144. Powell, Indirect Encroachment upon Federal Authority by the Tax-ing Power of the States (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 927-928; Magill, Tax
Exemption of State Employees (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 956.
Washington University Open Scholarship
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
Gerhardt case Mr. Justice Stone announced that the fact that an
activity might be immune was no assurance that the salary de-
rived from such operation should be, because the effect of such
tax was conjectural. The income from a source and the source
itself are separate and distinct taxable subjects; a tax upon in-
come is not equivalent to a tax upon the source. 45 When a salary
is paid, it is divorced from its source.1'46 There is no reason why
the government employee should not contribute his proportionate
share of the cost of the protection which the other sovereign
gives him. A tax would be impalpable in influencing an employee
to accept a position with the government rather than with a
private employer. If a tax did in fact cause a government to
raise salaries to mitigate the tax burden, this result would be
simply a normal consequence of the existence within the same
territory of two governments both possessing a taxing power.- 7
VII
In the field of state taxation of federal securities and federal
taxation of state securities, the Court has disregarded economic
realities and accepted a conceptualistic approach.
The federal corporations' power to issue bonds is expressly
given.'41 They often are required to issue their security obliga-
tions through the Secretary of the Treasury,'1 9 whose approval
is a prerequisite to issuance."5 Some of the bonds are "fully and
145. N. Y. ex rel. Cohen v. Graves (1937) 300 U. S. 308, 313, 314;
Hale v. State Board (1937) 302 U. S. 95; Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen (19387
304 U. S. 307, all overruling sub silentio Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; (1896) 158 U. S. 601.
146. Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245.
147. Cf. Stone, J., in Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 976.
148. In the field of private corporations the power to borrow money for
purposes incidental to corporate existence is generally implied. 6 Fletcher,
Private Corporations (Perm. Ed. 1931) sec. 2610. Of the federal-owned
corporations, only two do not have the power to issue bonds. Farmers'
Home Corp. (1937) 50 Stat. 527, (1938 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1014, and
Federal Crop Insurance Corp., Pub. No. 430, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
Both are bodies corporate "within" the Department of Agriculture.
149. See, for example, sec. 20(e) of United States Housing Act. (1937)
50 Stat. 888, (1938 Supp.) 42 U. S. C. A. secs. 1401-2. It is customary
to provide that the Secretary prepare the forms of bonds, and that the
engraved plates, dies, etc., executed in connection therewith shall remain
in the custody of the Secretary of the Treasury. The issuing corporation
is to reimburse the Secretary of the Treasury for any expense incurred in
this connection. See sec. 11 of R. F. C. Act (1932) 47 Stat. 5; sec. 23 of
Federal Home Loan Bank Act (1932) 47 Stat. 725.
150. The Secretary's approval is required before the following corpora-
tions may issue debentures: Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, U. S.
Housing Authority, and Commodity Credit Corporation.
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unconditionally guaranteed both as to principal and interest" by
the United States ;151 others must appeal to purchasers without
this guarantee.15 2 But with a few exceptions, all are tax-ex-
empt. 53 That Congress can, if it sees fit, exempt such securities
from state taxation seems to the Supreme Court "obvious upon
the clearest principles.' 4
The doctrine denying to the states the right to levy an excise
tax on federal securities, which immunity the government cor-
porations are claiming,"5 was first announced by Chief Justice
Marshall in Weston v. Town of Charleston.5 0 The case is in one
respect a narrow application of the rule of immunity, because
here the tax was levied against the exercise of one of Congress'
expressed powers, viz., the power to borrow money; in another
it extends the rule because the taxpayer was a private person
and not the government. Since Marshall regarded the right to
impose a tax, if it exists, as "acknowledging no limit,"'15  he dis-
regarded the discriminatory nature of the tax involved.r,
151. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion, Commodity Credit Corporation, Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation,
and U. S. Housing Authority. The acts generally provide that the govern-
ment's guarantee shall be expressed on the face of the obligation. The
right of the government to guarantee the obligations issued by its agencies
is an aspect of the right to borrow on the credit of the United States.
(1933) 37 Ops. Att'y Gen. 241, 247: "The power to borrow on the credit
of the United States necessarily includes the power to make only a partial
use of that credit for borrowing purposes." (1933) 38 Ops. Att'y Gen.
258, 272: "The power to expend necessarily includes the power to assume
contractually obligations to pay money, and contingent obligations are as
much within the power as are absolute promises. Furthermore, the power
of the Congress to borrow on the credit of the United States-which must
permit borrowings for all purposes for which the Congress is authorized to
make expenditures-logically [legally?] authorize a guarantee by the United
States of obligations incurred by its agencies in borrowing money." Origi-
nally the bonds of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation were guaranteed
only as to interest; but now they are fully guaranteed as to both principal
and interest. The bonds of the federal land banks were originally guaran-
teed as to interest but are now no longer guaranteed at all. (1934) 48
Stat. 346, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 992a.
152. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Mortgage Associa-
tions (neither of these corporations having issued any bonds as yet), cor-
porations under the supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
and Farm Credit Administration.
153. See discussion in text, supra, at notes 35-41.
154. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1922) 255 U. S. 180, 212.
155. (1933) 37 Ops. Att'y Gen. 241, holding the immunity valid as to
bonds issued by the H. 0. L. C., and indicating that the rule of the Smith
case, (1922) 255 U. S. 180, could sustain the immunity as to all other
government corporations.
156. (1829) 2 Peters 449.
157. 2 Peters at 466.
158. Only five items were taxed under the act in question. Because, how-
ever, it was a hostile discrimination, Mr. Justice Johnson thought that the
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The national government's inability to tax the income from
state securities dates from Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co."9 The entire Court, divided on other issues, agreed that the
tax upon income from state and municipal bonds was unconsti-
tutional,'6 ' failing to recognize the important distinction between
a tax upon the income from the bonds and a tax directly upon
the bonds. Viewing the tax as one of the obligations,' 6 ' the Court
had only to rely on precedent to hold the tax unconstitutional.' 6 2
Had the distinction been appreciated, the Court would have not
been driven to its unfortunate conclusion. This it clear from the
opinion rendered upon rehearing.0 3 After explaining that the
first opinion ruled that income from municipal bonds could not
be taxed because of "want of power to tax the source," 164 the
Chief Justice went on to announce that "income is taxable irre-
spective of the source from whence it is derived."'I6 5 But the
damage was done. Subsequent courts accepted the doctrine that
the federal government had no power to tax the income from
state securities without challenge.
The immunity, where it exists, is not confined to securities
issued directly by the government; it extends to the securities
issued by federal instrumentalities'0 6 or by state instrumentali-
ties '6 except where the federal tax is supported by other ex-
pressed powers."" Attempts to escape the rule of the Weston
tax should have been sustained. Id. at 472-473. Mr. Justice Thompson, dis-
senting, accused the majority decision of "establishing a privileged class
of public creditors, who, though living under the protection of the govern-
ment, are exempted from bearing any of its burdens." Id. at 478.
159. In which the income tax provisions of the 1894 Revenue Act were
declared unconstitutional. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; (1896) 158 U. S. 601.
The case was the first in which a stockholder's suit was used to contest
the validity of a federal law. See Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business
of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936 (1938) 51
Harv. L. Rev. 577,629.
160. Fuller, C. J., for the majority, 157 U. S. at 429; Field, J., id. at
601-604; White. ., id. at 652; Harlan, J., id. at 652-654.
161. Id. at 429, 586, 601-3, 652, 653-4.
162. United States v. B. & 0. R. R. (1872) 17 Wall. 322, holding uncon-
stitutional a federal income tax on private bonds owned by a municipality.
163. (1896) 158 U. S. 601.
164. 158 U. S. at 618.
165. 158 U. S. at 629.
166. Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky (1869) 9 Wall. 353 (national
banks): Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minnesota (1914) 232
U. S. 516 (territorial municipalities).
167. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1896) 158 U. S. 601. But
cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107.
168. Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533; Trustees of Illinois Uni-
versity v. United States (1933) 289 U. S. 48.
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case by levying taxes on the stock held by a state corporation ;'
on the valuation of a corporation equal to the amount of its capi-
tal stock, some of which was invested in government securities ;17o
by a license tax measured by the income from tax-exempt securi-
ties ;171 or by permitting only an illusory deduction,112 have failed.
Moreover, the rule cannot be evaded by taxes which in any man-
ner discriminate against the securities. 7 3 A state's power 74 to
tax corporate franchises is, however, unaffected by the fact that
the corporation has its capital invested in tax-exempt federal
securities, 1" 5 although the difference-economically speaking-
between a tax on the capital of a corporation and a tax on its
franchise measured by its capital is the difference between
"tweedledum and tweedledee."' 6
Concerning the immunity expressly extended to stock in the
federal government-corporation, 177 we are forced to look to the
169. Bank of Commerce v. Tax Commissioners (1863) 2 Black 620.
170. Bank Tax Cases (1865) 2 Wall. 200.
171. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin (1927) 275 U. S.
136.
172. National Life Insurance Co. v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 508;
Missouri Insurance Co. v. Gehner (1930) 281 U. S. 313. In each of these
cases Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Holmes dissented on the ground that
the construction adopted by the majority of the Court did more than pro-
tect the ownership of government securities and conferred upon that owner-
ship an affirmative benefit at the expense of the taxing power of the state.
173. Miller v. Milwaukee (1927) 272 U. S. 713; Macallen Co. v. Massa-
chusetts (1929) 279 U. S. 620, reh'g denied (1929) 280 U. S. 513, as ex-
plained in Pacific Co. v. Johnson (1932) 285 U. S. 480, 494; Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Philadelphia (1936) 296 U. S. 113. For a criticism of the
Macallen case, written before the Court "explained" the decision, see Powell,
An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 889.
174. A state may lawfully impose its inheritance tax on a bequest of
federal securities. Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115. Cf. Snyder v.
Bettman (1903) 190 U. S. 249 (federal inheritance tax applied to legacy to
a municipal corporation); Greiner v. Lewellyn (1922) 258 U. S. 384. It
has been long settled that one state may tax the securities of another state.
Bonaparte v. Tax Court (1881) 104 U. S. 592.
175. Society for Savings v. Colite (1868) 6 Wallace 594; Provident Sav-
ings Institution v. Massachusetts (1868) 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Mfg. Co. v.
Massachusetts (1868) 6 Wall. 632; Home Insurance Co. v. New York
(1889) 134 U. S. 594. And the reverse is also true. Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co. (1910) 220 U. S. 107.
176. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Power of the States (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 915.
177. The exemptions have been upheld. Ops. Att'y Gen. of Pa. (1935-36)
p. 59; Ops. Att'y Gen. of Utah, June 5, 1935; C. C. H. Bank Law Serv.,
Par. No. 13,508. The lone exception is the shares of stock in the Federal
credit unions. They are expressly made subject to state taxes in the hands
of the owner. Federal Credit Union Act, sec. 18 (1934) 48 Stat. 1216,
(1936) 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 1751. In Missouri the tax exemption of the
shares of stock in a Federal Land Bank was not placed upon the federal
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analogous situation in the case of the taxation of shares of stock
in national banks. Shares in national banks would not be taxable
to the owner except for the statutory permission which Congress
has given.178 A tax on a stockholder, however, may be assessed
without regard to the fact that the assets of the corporation in-
clude government securities. 79 Where the tax, while nominally
on the shares of the corporate stock, is actually on the corpora-
tion, federal securities may not be included in assessing the value
of the shares for taxation.180
It seems that in this matter the Court has engaged in a little
mental gymnastics. If there is any economic truth to the Weston
case, then the Van Allen case was incorrectly decided, for if the
real owners of corporate property are the stockholders, the real
incident of the tax falls upon them whether the tax is on the
bank or on them. In the Weston line of decisions the Court has
yielded to the commands of legalistic ritual subversive of the
basis on which the doctrine of immunity rests. In the Van Allen
line of cases the Court has accepted as an economic truism that
a tax which does not discriminate against governmental securi-
ties is not a burden upon the government issuing the securities.
What the lawyer may call intergovernmental immunity, the
economist may justly label intergovernmental subsidy.'- Trea-
statute but on the ground that the bank's business was confined to farm
loans and therefore was not a "banking business" within the meaning of
the Missouri statute subjecting shares of stock in banks doing a banking
business to state taxation. State ex rel. Compton v. Buder (1925) 308 Mo.
253, 271 S. W. 772.
178. (1923) 42 Stat. 1499; (1926) 44 Stat. 223, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A.
see. 548; People v. Weaver (1879) 100 U. S. 539, 543; Owensboro National
Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664, 669; Des Moines National Bank
v. Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S. 103, 106; First National Bank v. Ander-
son (1926) 269 U. S. 341.
179. Van Allen v. Assessors (1866) 3 Wall. 573; Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Lander (1902) 184 U. S. 111; Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather
(1926) 269 U. S. 341.
180. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503. There
is some reason to believe that the cited case has been recently overruled
sub silentio. In Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania (1938) 302 U. S. 506
the Court held that the State of Pennsylvania, in taxing shares of trust
companies on the basis of value as reflected from the companies' paid-in
capital, surplus, and undivided profits, was not obliged to exclude from the
measure obligations of the federal government owned by the companies.
181. Brabson, Income Tax Exemptions and the Loss of Federal Revenue
(1937) 15 Tax Mag. 8; Withers, The Menace of Tax-Exempt Bonds (1935)
141 Nation 241; Rowe, The Burden of Tax Exemption of Government Bonds
(1926) 16 Amer. Econ. Rev. 653; Martin, The Social Aspects of Tax Ex-
emption (1936) 183 Annals 48.
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sury operations indicate that the credit of the federal government
does not need the stimulation of the tax-exemption device; the
strength of the federal credit and the easy state of the money
market makes this a propitious moment for the removal of this
imponderable obstacle to a just distribution of the tax load. 182
It is more important that the national government be per-
mitted to tax the income from state securities than that the states
be allowed to tax the income derived from the securities of the
federal government or its instrumentalities. The states can, and
generally do, reach federal securities by a general property tax;
but the federal government is denied the right to tax the prop-
erty of state corporations effectively because of the constitutional
requirement of apportionment. The burden of an income tax
is insignificant in contrast to the burden of a general property
tax.
And what of the Pollock case? Altogether aside from the effect
of the Sixteenth Amendment, the "want of the power to tax the
source" basis should no longer prevent the application of a fed-
eral income tax to the income from state securities. Thrice with-
in the past two years the Court has expressly recognized the
distinction between the "source" and the "income," and in each
case the appreciation of this difference prompted the sustaining
of a state tax on income from a "source" which for constitutional
or statutory reasons would have been exempt.18 3 The Court need
now only accept the words of Chief Justice Fuller in the Pollockc
case. 
8 34
There is a need to remove the entire doctrine insofar as it
182. Martin, op. cit. supra, note 181.
183. New York ex rel. Cohen v. Graves (1936) 300 U. S. 308, sustain-
ing a New York income tax on rents derived from property in New Jersey
because "income is not necessarily clothed with the immunity enjoyed by its
source"; Hale v. State Board (1937) 302 U. S. 95, upholding state income
tax upon bonds issued tax-exempt; Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen (1938) 304
U. S. 307, deciding that the Indiana gross income tax might lawfully be
assessed against the income from tax-exempt municipal bonds. There is
nothing in Evans v. Gore (1930) 253 U. S. 245 to the contrary. The ex-
emption which it extends to federal judicial salaries is not premised upon
the "source" of the salary but upon the recipient. U. S. Const. Art. III.
183a. "But if * * * the interest when received has become merely money
in the recipient's pocket and taxable as such without reference to the source
from which it came, the question is immaterial whether it could have been
originally taxed at all or not * * *." 229 (1898) 158 U. S. 601, 630. See
Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employ-
ees (1938) 105-119.
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impedes the just administration of our taxing system.18' There
seems to be no special reason to remove this subsidy from the
securities of government corporations, state or federal, unless a
corresponding privilege is denied the tax-exempt securities now
issued by conventional government sources, with which the se-
curities of government corporations compete in the open mar-
ket.-'
VIII
The attorney of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation has ruled
that the corporation is not subject to state sales taxes, and the
California Supreme Court has decided that the state's sales tax
may not be imposed on purchases of federal land banks and other
corporations comprising a farm credit district, although paid to
the state by the vendor."," This conclusion is probably correct.
In 1928 the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that
a state could not lawfully tax the sale of gasoline to the United
States Coast Guard Fleet and Veteran's Hospital, because "the
necessary operation * * * is directly to retard, impede, and bur-
den the exertion by the United States of its constitutional powers
to operate the fleet and hospital.' 811 7 After granting a reciprocal
immunity to the vendor of motorcycles to a state against a fed-
eral excise tax,""' the Court extended the immunity by declaring
unlawful the attempt of Alabama to apply a tax, exclusively upon
the privilege of sale, to gasoline sold to the federal government.28
In 1937, however, the Court held that the federal government
could lawfully impose an excise tax on the manufacture of to-
184. As of June 30, 1937, there was $50,522,000,000 of wholly or par-
tially tax-exempt securities held by non-governmental owners. This amount
exempts from taxation an income of $1,554,000. N. Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1938, p. 25: 1.
185. See p. 86 of Reply Brief of Respondent written by Mr. (now Chief
Justice) Hughes in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1922) 255
U. S. 180.
186. M. G. West Co. v. Johnson (Cal. 1937) 66 P. (2d) 1211. But the
Treasury Department has ruled that persons selling articles to government
corporations are not exempt from the federal manufacturer's excise tax.
S. T. No. 731, April 2, 1934. There being no federal sales tax, the treat-
ment of the relation of sales taxes to the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity may be confined to the effect of local and state taxes on pur-
chases of federal-owned government corporations.
187. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1928) 277 U. S. 218, 222. In
accord, Texas Co. v. Carmichael (D. C. M. D. Ala. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 242,
with Hutcheson. J., dissenting.
188. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 570.
189. Graves v. Texas Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 393. Mr. Justice Cardozo
and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented. Mr. Justice Stone did not sit.
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bacco subsequently sold to a state for free distribution in a state
hospital.19
The cases involving taxation of independent contractors work-
ing under contracts with the federal government look in a differ-
ent direction. It has been held that the state may lawfully apply
its excise tax on gasoline used by such a contractor.19  Originally
the Court declared a state tax on the net income on profits de-
rived by the lessee of Indian lands unconstitutional.""2 With this
rule the court played hide-and-seek 93 until March 7, 1938, when
it was discarded because, in the words of the Chief Justice,
* * * where it merely appears that one operating under a
government contract or lease is subjected to a tax with re-
spect to his profits on the same basis as others who are
engaged in similar businesses, there is no sufficient ground
for holding that the effect upon the Government is other
than indirect and remote.'9 '
Unlike state taxation of revenue derived from interstate com-
merce, in the field of intergovernmental taxation there is no dis-
tinction made between taxes upon gross and net income. In the
first case to sustain a state tax on the gross income derived from
furnishing a service-here direct-to the federal government
190. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States (1937) 299 U. S.
383.
191. Trinityfarm Co. v. Grosjean (1934) 291 U. S. 466. But a state
may not include government messages in taxing telegraph companies. West.
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas (1881) 105 U. S. 460; Williams v.
Talladega (1912) 226 U. S. 404.
192. Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1922) 257 U. S. 501.
193. In 1931, the Court held that the rule of the Gillespie case did not
apply where the taxable income was derived by the lessee from lands which
the Court found had really been sold. Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass(1931) 283 U. S. 279. But the rule of the Gillespie case was revived long
enough to declare invalid the levying of the federal income tax on the
profits derived from a lease of school lands. Burnet v. Coronado Ol and
Gas Co. (1932) 285 U. S. 393. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stone,
speaking also for Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Cardozo, said he thought
the Gillespie case ought to be overruled. In the next case a unanimous
Court "distinguished" the Burnet case and approved a federal income tax
on lessee of municipally owned oil lands. Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust
(1933) 288 U. S. 508. This was followed in Atkinson v. State Tax Com-
mission of Oregon (1938) 58 S. Ct. 419 and Bankline Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner (1938) 303 U. S. 363. Finally in Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corporation (1938) 303 U. S. 376, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, expressly overruled the Burnet v. Coronado Oil Co. and
Gillespie v. Oklahoma cases. For a revealing discussion of the Chief Jug-
tices' "about-face" see Dilliard, The Chief Justice on Tax Immunity (1938)
27 Survey Graphic 338.
194. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp. (1938) 303 U. S. 376, 386-7.
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there was congressional consent to state taxation.195 Recently in
James v. Dravo Contracting Co. the Court sustained, by a vote
of five-to-four, a non-discriminatory state gross receipts tax upon
income derived by a contractor with the federal government. 98
A combination of three factors seems to have controlled the
majority opinion: (1) the tax was not discriminatory, (2) it
was levied against an independent contractor, and (3) the tax
was not on the contract with the federal government.197 Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes thought the question of the taxability of a
contractor "upon the fruits of his service" was the same as a
tax on his property used in performing the services since "his
earnings flow from his work; his property is employed in secur-
ing them."'198 Mr. Justice Roberts in a lucid dissent pointed out
that "to use the value and amount of the goods and services
furnished to the United States as a measure of the tax is in sub-
stance and effect to tax the transaction itself." 99
From an economic standpoint, the Dravo case is difficult to
justify. The federal power to contract for supplies or services
is as necessary as the power to borrow money and to employ
officers. A tax on the gross receipts of one who supplies the
government with goods or services is in effect a sales tax, and
will prove a greater burden to the government than a tax on the
income of its employee or on its bonds. The only justification
for the Dravo case then is that the only party who was entitled
to the benefit of the immunity, if any, was the federal govern-
ment-and it disclaimed the immunity.
Ix
Not all activities pursued under the state auspices are immune
from federal taxation. In South Carolina v. United States20° the
Supreme Court, three justices dissenting,21 declared that the
195. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania (1916) 240 U. S. 319 (tax
on gross income from bonds furnished by the taxpayer to federal officials).
196. (1937) 302 U. S. 134, rev'g (D. C. S. D. W. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
527. Accord, Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 233
and Ryan v. Washington (1937) 302 U. S. 186. See Note (1938) 51 Harv.
L. Rev. 707, 713.
197. Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 707, 713: " * * * it is difficult to
discover on what theory the opinion proceeds."
198. (1937) 202 U, S. 134, 153.
199. Id. at 170.
200. (1905) 199 U. S. 437. In accord, see Ohio v. Helvering (1934) 292
U. S. 360; ef. Salt Lake City v. Hollister (1886) 118 U. S. 256.
201. Mr. Justice White, with whom Justices Peckham and McKenna con-
curred, said: " * * * the decision [of the majority] overrules many cases,
19381
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federal excise tax on liquor could lawfully be imposed upon a
liquor dispensing system operated by the state. There were two
bases for the decision: (1) the rule of immunity is limited to
functions "ordinarily" performed by the state and of a "strictly"
governmental character, and does not extend to those activities
generally performed by private enterprises, because (2) a state
may not withdraw sources of revenue from the federal govern-
ment by entering into essentially "proprietary" activities, to
which the federal taxing power would normally extend. Since
then the Court has indicated that application of the decision de-
pends upon whether the activity is one "usually,'202 "essen-
tially,"20 3 and finally "traditionally" 20 4 governmental. Recently
the Court ruled that the federal excise tax may be collected on
the price of admission to football games conducted by state uni-
versities.205 In the words of Mr. Justice Roberts, the immunity
is inapplicable where the state "has embarked in a business hav-
ing the incidents of similar enterprises usually prosecuted for
private gain.11206
The disturbing part of the cases is the failure to announce
any formula by which to determine whether or not an activity
is strictly governmental in character. In South Carolina v.
United States, Mr. Justice Brewer indicated some possible con-
siderations. His suggestion that determination of what is a
governmental function for purposes of tax immunity should be
decided in the light of conditions existing at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution 207 would deny to the states the right
departs from a principle which has been recognized from the beginning.
* * * the ancient landmarks are obliterated and the distinct powers belong-
ing to both the National and State Governments are reciprocally placed the
one at the mercy of the other, so as to give to each the potency of destroy-
ing the other." (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 464.
202. Helvering v. Powers (1934) 293 U. S. 214.
203. Brush v. Commissioner (1937) 300 U. S. 352.
204. United States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175, 184. This case
involved regulation and not taxation.
205. Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgia (1938) 58 S. Ct.
980. Justices Reed, Stone, and Black concurred but on the ground that the
action should have been dismissed because the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 169,
sec. 10, 14 Stat. 475, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1543, proscribed the plain-
tiff's right to sue to enjoin the collection of the tax. Cf. Note (1937) 23
Va. L. Rev. 570.
206. (1938) 58 S. Ct. at 986. Justices Butler and McReynolds voted to
declare the tax unconstitutional because they were of the opinion that the
conduct of football games was an integral part of the program of public
education and that it did not cease to be such because it produces gain.
207. (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 456-457.
Washington University Open Scholarship
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
to perform functions made necessary by an increasingly complex
society.2 ,"  The same criticism may be made of his suggestion
to use the common law activities of the state as the norm.209 His
analogy to the governmental and proprietary capacities of munic-
ipalities in the field of tort liability is inadequate, because that
distinction is premised upon a misconception 210 and persists by
reason of antiquity alone.2 1' What the Court did was to intro-
duce into the law of federal taxation a concept of "private busi-
ness" which, in indefiniteness, parallels that of the "police
power,"212 and which has led lower courts21 3 and itself2 14 along
a zig-zag path. There is no formula by which a priori a line of
demarcation between "private" and "governmental" activities
may be drawn. All that is certain is that the exemption from
federal taxation does not extend to every instrumentality which
a state may see fit to employ.
The difficulty of "drawing the line" is not the greatest objec-
tion, for "drawing the line" is the question in pretty much every
thing worth arguing about in the law. 21 44 Objection may be
directed to the very attempt of the Court to set a standard which
would be synonymous with tax-exemption or tax-liability. Actu-
208. Id. at 472.
209. Id. at 458-459.
210. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1929) 34 Yale L. J. 1,
129, 229.
211. Freedman, Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Missouri
(1938) 3 Mo. L. Rev. 275, 296.
212. Note (1932) 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194, 195.
213. Government functions: Regents of University of Georgia v. Page
(D. C. D. Ga. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 62, aff'd (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d)
887 (football games), rev'd (1938) 58 S. Ct. 980; Hopkins v. Commissioner
(C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 627 (school cafeteria); Therrell v. Commis-
sioner (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 869, and Tunnicliffe v. Commissioner
(C. C. A. 5, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 873 (state bank liquidator), both rev'd (1938)
.58 S. Ct. 539; Commissioner v. Ten Eyck (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d)
515 (Albany Port Authority).
Proprietary functions: North Dakota v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 33 F.
(2d) 848, dismissed for want of jurisdiction (1929) 280 U. S. 528; Saxe v.
Anderson (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 21 (court-appointed guar-
dian) ; Galveston v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 810 (opera-
tion of a wharf); Garden Homes v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 7, 1933) 64
F. (2d) 593 (housing).
214. The salary of an attorney of the Panama Railroad Company is
exempt from state taxation, see People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves (1936)
299 U. S. 401; but the salary of a special attorney of Pennsylvania is not
exempt from federal taxation. Lucas v. Reed (1930) 281 U. S. 699. The
operation of a waterworks is a governmental function. Brush v. Commis-
sioner (1937) 300 U. S. 352, but the operation of a transit system is not.
Helvering v. Powers (1934) 293 U. S. 214.
214a. Holmes, J., in Irvin v. Gavit (1925) 268 U. S. 161, 168.
1938]
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ally whether a function is essential to the attainment of a given
end is a political question. 214b The genius of our system of gov-
ernment lies largely in that phase which permits the citizenry
acting through its elected legislative representative to determiue
what services are required in the public interest. When Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority in the Brush
case,215 stressed the extent of the public interest in the activity
assumed by the government as an aid in ascertaining whether
it was an essential governmental function, it appeared as though
the Court recognized that conceptions of essential governmental
functions differ with individual philosophies. It is submitted
that Mr. Justice Stone in the Gerhardt decision, 210 with due solic-
itude for the imperative need to preserve intact existing sources
of revenue, 21 7 announced a test consistent with the thesis ad-
vanced. The decision clearly establishes that a federal tax may
be applied to any state activity which is "not one without which
a state could not continue to exist as a governmental entity."
This was a subtle way of saying that the immunity extends to
no activities of the states other than those performed by the
three departments of government.211
That a state might divest itself of its sovereign character by
entering into corporate activities essentially private (in the strict
sense of the word) has long been accepted.210 The activities of
the federal-owned corporations with which we are concerned,
generally speaking, are innovations in the field of governmental
activity. As to them we get no help from tradition or stare
decisis. To date the more considerable authority among such
adjudications as there have been on the question of whether the
activities of the corporations are governmental or proprietary
regards them as governmental. 220
214b. See Luther v. Borden (1849) 7 How. 1; Pacific States T. & T. Co.
V. Oregon (1912) 223 U. S. 118.
215. (1936) 300 U. S. 352.
216. Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969.
217. It is of more than passing interest that in Helvering v. Mountain
Products Co. (1938) 303 U. S. 376, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes undertook
to reexamine the rule of Gillespie v. Oklahoma "in light of the expanding
needs of State and Nation." Then he made reference to a "principle, but-
tressed by the most cogent considerations, that the power to tax should
not be crippled."
218. Admittedly, on the facts, the case did not go so far. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the opinion presages the conclusion here drawn.
219. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824) 9
Wheat. 904, 907; cf. Helvering v. Ohio (1934) 292 U. S. 360, 369.
220. Governmental: Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1922) 255
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It may well be questioned whetler a function which is either
"governmental" or "proprietary" as the case may be when per-
formed by a state need be the same when performed by the
federal government. The traditional functions and expressed
purposes of the two by no means coincide.221
The mere fact that a corporation operates under a federal
franchise will not render it immune from state taxation if the
corporation is "private." 222 Commentators have undertaken to
suggest criteria,223 all of the suggested formulae in some manner
stressing the "profit" or "self-sustaining" feature. What they
seem to overlook is that upon liquidation all assets become the
property of the United States Treasury. And too, why must a
governmental activity be operated at a loss?
It is necessary to consider whether the federal government can
constitutionally engage in a "proprietary" function. If an activ-
ity may constitutionally be pursued, must it necessarily be a
"governmental" activity? It is a truism that the federal govern-
ment is one of enumerated powers, while the states enjoy resid-
ual powers. From this it has been argued224 that the distinction
U. S. 180; Federal Land Bank v. Gaines (1933) 290 U. S. 47; Federal
Land Bank v. Priddy (1935) 295 U. S. 299, 231; Federal Land Bank v.
Crossland (1923) 261 U. S. 374; People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves (1937)
299 U. S. 401; Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission (1936)
297 U. S. 209; Hartford Production Credit Ass'n v. Clark (1934) 118 Conn.
341, 172 Atl. 266; Ellingson v. Iowa Joint Stock Land Bank (S. D. 1936)
264 N. W. 516; Langer v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1935) 76 F. (2d)
817; United States v. Lewis (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 471;
United States v. Doherty (D. C. D. Neb. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 793.
Proprietary: Clinton v. State Tax Commission (Kan. 1937) 71 P. (2d)
857; Pomeroy v. Board of Equalization (1935) 99 Mont. 534, 45 P. (2d)
316; Central Market, Inc. v. King (Neb. 1937) 272 N. W. 244; Gill v.
Reese (1936) 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273; Pennell v. H. 0. L. C.
(D. C. D. Me. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 497.
221. For example, functions such as were exercised during the War by
government corporations could not be considered "private," since they were
serving the government in the carrying on of the War. See (1936) 49
Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
222. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission (1931) 283 U. S.
291, 294. The distinction has long been taken between a privilege of fran-
chise granted by the government to a private corporation in order to effect
some governmental purpose and the property employed by the grantee in
the exercise of the privilege but for private business advantage.
223. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 Va. L.
Rev. 351; Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323, 1329; Note (1933) 11 Temple
L. Rev. 383; Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and
State Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 807.
224. Stokes, State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities
(1936) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 39; cf. Graham, J., in Alabama v. United States
(1930) 69 Ct. Cl. 340, 38 F. (2d) 897, 902-3, rev'd (1931) 282 U. S. 502;
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between governmental and proprietary functions of the states2 5
is foreign to established views of the nature of the federal gov-
ernment. There is, however, more imposing authority to the
contrary. 2 2  Legalistically, the former may be the better view,
but if it is, it does violence to actualities. For our purposes we
may base our determination not upon the source from which the
function is derived but upon the function itself. The mere fact
that the function is derived from the national government does
not determine its nature.2 2
7
Suppose the corporations are performing functions which the
courts will regard as proprietary.228 Does it necessarily follow
that the doctrine of the South Carolina case applies in reverse?
It is perhaps of some significance that the Court has never sus-
tained a state tax upon any federal instrumentality to which Con-
gress has specifically granted exemption. What the cases reveal
is this: A federal chartered bank is exempt from state taxation
in the absence of express consent to be taxed, 2 2 but a state char-
tered bank is subject to federal taxation whether privately or
state owned ;230 the salary of an attorney for a federal instru-
Oliver P. Field, State versus Nation and the Supreme Court (1934) 28
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 233, 243, and see Note (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 326, 337.
225. Cf. Ohio v. Helvering (1934) 292 U. S. 360, 369: "If a state
chooses to go into the business of buying and selling commodities, its right
to do so may be conceded so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned;
but the exercise of the right is not the performance of a governmental
function, and must find its support in some authority apart from the police
power." It is to be noted that the same state functions which were held
"proprietary" when federal taxation was involved were held "governmental"
when the power of the state to levy a tax for their support was involved.
Cf. Vance v. Vandercook Co. (1898) 170 U. S. 438, with South Carolina v.
United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437; Green v. Frazier (1920) 253 U. S.
233, with South Dakota v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 848; Boston
v. Jackson (1922) 260 U. S. 309, with Helvering v. Powers (1934) 293
U. S. 214; see Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323, 1325n.
226. Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Foote (C. C. D. Idaho 1911) 192 Fed.
583; Clinton v. Commission (Kan. 1937) 71 P. (2d) 857; Pomeroy v. Board
of Equalization (1935) 99 Mont. 534, 45 P. (2d) 316; Central Market, Inc.
v. King (Neb. 1937) 272 N. W. 244; Gill v. Reese (1936) 53 Ohio App.
134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273; Tax Commission v. Baltimore Nat. Bank (1935)
169 Md. 65, 72, 180 Atl. 260, rev'd (1936) 297 U. S. 209.
227. See Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1937) 85.
228. For this writer's opinion to the effect that most of the federal-owned
corporations are not engaged in proprietary functions, see Freedman, Book
Review (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 293, 295-296.
229. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316; Owensboro National
Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664.
230. Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1870) 8 Wall. 533; North Dakota v. Olson
(C. C. A. 8, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 848, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (1929)
280 U. S. 528.
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mentality is exempt from state taxation,2 31 but the salary of a
state attorney 2 and that of an employee of a state agency 233 are
not exempt from federal taxation; the principle of immunity
does not prevent the federal government from levying import
duties on supplies purchased by state instrumentalities, 23' and
a state-owned and -operated railroad is subject tor federal regu-
lation ;215 a federal corporate excise tax may be measured by the
income from tax-exempt securities, 216 although a state tax on a
federal franchise is not allowed ;227 a federal tax measured by
transportation costs was upheld when applied to materials sold
to a state agency,22 but a state may not tax the storage or with-
drawal of gasoline sold to a federal instrumentality ;239 and finally
it is proper to levy a federal tax on the manufacture of tobacco
which was sold to a state hospital for free distribution to pa-
tients,2 4' but a state tax on materials sold to the federal govern-
ment is unconstitutional. 241
Even to admit that many of the above decisions242 can be
explained or reconciled by saying that the immunity of state
agencies is not enjoyed where the federal tax is imposed in the
exercise of a granted power other than the taxing power would
leave other decisions unexplained. 24 3 Unless the cases are taken
to mean that the federal immunity is more extensive than the
supposedly reciprocal state immunity,2 4 4 how can the Rogers
case 243 exist side-by-side with the Brush case? 248 How is Mr. Jus-
tice Stone's failure to cite the Rogers case in the Gerhardt247
case to be accounted for?
231. People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves (1937) 299 U. S. 401.
232. Lucas v. Reed (1930) 281 U. S. 699.
233. Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969.
234. Trustees of Illinois University v. United States (1933) 289 U. S. 48.
235. United States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175.
236. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1910) 220 U. S. 107.
2"7. California v. Central Pacific R. R. (1887) 127 U. S. 1.
238. Wheeler Lumber Co. v. United States (1930) 281 U. S. 572.
239. Graves v. Texas Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 393.
240. Liggett & Myers v. United States (1936) 299 U. S. 383.
241. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1928) 277 U. S. 218.
242. Particularly cases cited supra, notes 230, 234, and 235.
243. Cases cited supra, notes 236. 238, and 240.
244. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 523-4; United
States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175, 184; Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States (1930) 283 U. S. 570, 575.
245. (1937) 299 U. S. 401.
246. (1937) 300 U. S. 352.
247. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969.
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This explanation does not conclude our problem. Whether the
rule of South Carolina v. United States should apply to federal
agencies will depend largely upon a choice between two politico-
constitutional theories: the supremacy of the federal government
or reciprocity of federal and state instrumentalities. Mr. Justice
Brewer who spoke for the majority in the South Carolina case
indicated that he did not consider the rule of the case to apply
in the reverse.2 4
There is good reason why the exemption of federal instrumen-
talities from state taxation should be more zealously guarded
than state immunity from federal taxation. 24  The powers
granted to the national government are few in comparison with
those reserved to the states. A state tax on federal instrumen-
talities would have a greater effect on the federal sovereign than
a federal tax on state instrumentalities would have on state
sovereignty. Insofar, therefore, as the rule of the South Carolina
case is premised upon the necessity for placing a practical limi-
tation on the exemption of state agencies from federal taxation
so that the federal sources of revenue will not be destroyed, it
is unnecessary that the rule apply reciprocally. To carry over a
principle which was used to sustain surreptitiously the federal
supremacy and now to apply it to deny that supremacy would
be anomalous. 20 States aggrieved by excessive federal immunity
may seek relief through congressional consent, but the national
government is powerless in the face of an excessive constitutional
immunity of a state.2 5 1 Moreover, it is important not to extend
state immunity beyond the commands of the Constitution, for
once an immunity is granted, restoration of that power is un-
likely to be obtained through state action. States are without the
248. "Among those matters which are implied, though not expressed, is
that the nation may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a state from
discharging the ordinary functions of government, just as it follows from
the second clause of Article IV of the Constitution that no state can inter-
fere with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the National Government
of all the powers conferred upon it." (Italics supplied.) (1905) 199 U. S.
437, 451-452.
249. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheaton 316, 435, 436; Bradley,
J., dissenting in Railroad Co. v. Peniston (1873) 85 U. S. 5, 48; same in
Collector v. Day (1871) 11 Wallace 113; Stone, T., in Helvering V. Ger-
hardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 973.
250. Note (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 326, 338.
251. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheaton 316, 435-6; Helvering v.
Gerhardt (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 973; Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
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inducements to act which have occasionally persuaded Congress
to waive immunities thought to be excessive.
25 2
Congress by expressly providing that these corporate agencies
are to enjoy immunity from state taxation has indicated that it
considered that any state tax would impede the performance of
the corporation's governmental service. If the Court should hold
that the doctrine of the South Carolina case applies reciprocally,
in the absence of express exemption, it might conclude that Con-
gress could not by express legislation exempt instrumentalities
not exempt by constitutional implication.25 3 On the other hand
that the Court generally pays respect to a declaration of Con-
gress was recently demonstrated. 25 4 It may be submitted, then,
that the exemption from taxation is one of the rights and privi-
leges which Congress can confer upon its legitimate instrumen-
talities because in its judgment the grant is necessary for the
proper functioning of the agency. 255 Whether certain ends are
constitutional is, of course, a judicial question, but the selection
of the means for the accomplishment of ends which have been
judged constitutional and the determination of their character
and scope are matters of legislative policy.
25 6
Commentators generally agree that there is no rational basis
supporting the extension which the rule of tax immunity gives.
257
So long as the doctrine is retained there is no valid reason to
refuse to apply it in the case of government corporations. If
252. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp. (1928) 276 U. S. 575, 581.
253. Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323, 1331. Senator (later Mr.
Justice) Sutherland has said: "Congress has not power to exempt from
taxation anything which would not because of its nature be exempted under
the provisions of the Constitution." 53 Cong. Rec. 6962 (April 28, 1916).
254. Lawrence v. Shaw (1937) 300 U. S. 245, where a tax on the pay-
ments received by a guardian of an incompetent veteran was held invalid
because of the statutory immunity afforded by an act providing that pay-
ment of benefits shall "be exempt from taxation * * * before or after
receipt by the beneficiary."
255. Cf. Chase, C. J., in New York ex rel. Bank of New York v. Super-
visors (1869) 7 Wallace 26, 30, 31.
256. Stoke, State Taxation and The New Federal Instrumentalities (1936)
22 Iowa L. Rev. 39.
257. Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State
Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 807; Powell, Indirect
Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States
(1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 572, 721, 932; (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 243,
374, 634, 902; Watkins, The Power of the States and Federal Governments
to Tax One Another (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 475; Note (1936) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1323; Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933)
22 Geo. L. J. 1.
1938]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/2
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
Congress, instead of creating corporations through which to per-
form the services which the corporations perform, had created
an executive office and invested it with similar powers, would
anyone question the proposition that, under the existing law, the
property was tax-exempt and its employees agents of the United
States? The government corporation and the executive tribunal
should be similarly regarded, for in the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, "the incorporation and formal erection of a new per-
sonality was only for the convenience of the United States to
carry out its ends." 2 8
X
Because the Sixteenth Amendment may soon be the peg upon
which the abolition of state immunity from federal taxation will
be hung, it is desirable that a brief investigation into its fecund
possibilities be made.
The Amendment was the aftermath of the unpopular decision
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.2 5 1 holding the income
tax of 1894 unconstitutional. The public's displeasure with the
decision crystallized finally in the advocacy of a Constitutional
Amendment which would permit the federal government to put
in effect a tax policy premised upon "ability to pay." The original
draft of the proposal accepted the Pollock decision and sought
only to remove the rule of apportionment insofar as a tax on the
income from invested capital was a direct tax.20  When the
measure was reported out by the Senate Committee on Finance,21
it contaified significant changes. The word "direct" in the origi-
nal draft was eliminated, and following the word "income" there
was inserted the provocative phrase, "from whatever source de-
rived." In the debate that followed much attention was directed
to the effect of this 6kpression.212 It was the accepted conclusion
in the Senate, and later in the House,2 3 that the Amendment was
putting an effective end to the immunity from federal taxation.
After the proposal had passed both Houses of Congress, and
258. Clallam County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 341, 345; cf.
Sutherland, J., in People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves (1936) 299 U. S. 401, 408.
259. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; (1895) 158 U. S. 601.
260. 44 Cong. Rec. 3377 (June 17, 1909). The proposal read: "The Con-
gress shall have power to lay and collect direct taxes on income without
apportionment among the several states according to population."
261. 44 Cong. Rec. 3900 (June 28, 1909).
262. 44 Cong. Rec. 4106-4120 (July 5, 1909).
263. 44 Cong. Rec. 4389-4440 (July 12, 1909).
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while it was awaiting state ratification, the purport of the phrase
"from whatever source derived" was brought to the public's at-
tention. Governor (now Chief Justice) Hughes advised the New
York Assembly to reject the Amendment because it would per-
mit the taxation of income from state and municipal securities.2 64
With other state governors and congressmen expressing approval
or disagreement with Governor Hughes' expression,'21 Senator
Borah introduced a resolution instructing the Senate Judiciary
Committee to investigate and report on whether the New York
governor was correct. Before a report was forthcoming, Senator
Borah called up the resolution for discussion, and hastened to
give his assurance that the disputed clause added nothing to the
force or scope of the Amendment,'2 6 a conclusion approved by
Senator Root.26- Despite such telling expressions, there was
ample belief that the phrase did have the effect of disposing of
the immunity which state-derived income enjoyed from federal
taxation .231
The Department of Justice has recently released a well doc-
umented report which makes it abundantly clear that the
Amendment was ratified under the preponderant belief that Con-
gress was being granted the power to tax income from sources
heretofore considered immune.2 69
The judicial treatment of the Amendment, which developed
without benefit of adequate presentation of the contemporaneous
history27Zo has been premised upon a different supposition. The
Supreme Court - rightly or wrongly,271 but unquestionably
thoughtfully - concluded that the Amendment did not render
264. N. Y. Sen. Doe. No. 3 (1910).
265. See N. Y. Times and N. Y. World for Jan. 7, 8, 9, 1910.
266. 45 Cong. Rec. 1694 (Feb. 10, 1910).
267. 45 Cong. Rec. 2539-2540 (March 1, 1910).
268. The then-authoritative New York Times editorally reported: "In-
disputably they [the people] think and have a right to think that the
proposition is that Congress may tax all incomes. The four words mean the
same after the four thousand words of Senator Root's argument are di-
gested as before, and can not be made to mean anything different, except
by technicalities which can only prevail at the cost of defeating the people's
will." March 2, 1910, p. 8: 2.
269. Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees: The Im-
munity Rule and the Sixteenth Amendment (1938) 163-190.
270. Id. at 217.
271. Corwin, Constitutional Tax Exemptions (1924) 13 Nat. Mun. Rev.
51; Powell, The Sixteenth Amendment and Income from State Securities(1923) 2 Tax Mag. -; Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 794.
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taxable that which was not taxable before its enactment but
merely removed the source as a criterion of the necessity of
apportioning the tax.27 2 Antedating the recent statement of Mr.
Justice Black in the Gerhardt case 27 3 there were only the passing
protest of Mr. Justice Brandeis2 7 4 and the more elaborate dis-
approbation of Mr. Justice Holmes.2 7 5 They alone accepted the
terms of the amendment as a "comprehensive grant of power"
intended to do more than merely "obviate a single result."
Does the phrase "from whatever source derived" relate to the
extent of the power, and is it independent of the words dealing
with the subject of apportionment? Or was it merely introduced
to make the exemption from the rule of apportionment compre-
hensive, and therefore merely an adjectival amendment to Sec-
tions 2 and 9 of Article One? It is noteworthy that similarly-
worded clauses in other enactinents have been considered as in-
cluding income from state and municipal bonds.2 78 If the words
had not been thought to embody income from these sources, the
issue would never have arisen in the Pollock case. The Amend-
ment was sponsored with a view to removing the obstacles to
federal taxation raised by the Pollock case. Of the three phases
of the decision, two were that taxes on the income from realty
and personalty were direct taxes and, since not apportioned, were
void. The original draft of the Amendment-the draft without
the clause "from whatever source derived"V-would have success-
fully overcome these two holdings. The inclusion of the clause,
then, must have indicated an intention to go further. The next
step was the cancellation of the third phase of the case whereby
interest from state. and municipal securities was ruled immune
from federal taxation.2 7 This construction is not 6nly in accord
with the plain meaning of the words, but it is also supportable
272. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. (1916) 240 U. S. 1; Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 103; Peck v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S.
165; Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189; Evans v. Gore (1920) 253
U. S. 245.
273. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 969, 975.
274. Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 237.
275. Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 267.
276. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 112-118; Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107; cf. Collector v. Day (1871) 11 Wallace 113.
277. Magill, The Problem of Intergovernmental Tax Exemption (1937)
15 Tax Mag. 699; Hubbard, "From Whatever Source Derived" (1920) 6
A. B. A. J. 202; Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 794.
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by the object which the aroused public had sought to attain. The
Amendment arose from the well-considered conviction of its
necessity, and a construction which would impair its efficacy is
unwarranted 278-especially when it can be achieved only by deny-
ing to all-embracing terms their accepted meaning.
XI
As this article is written a Special Senate Committee is, acting
pursuant to a Resolution,'279 conducting a thorough study and
investigation with regard to the entire doctrine of intergovern-
mental tax immunity. The results of this investigation may en-
courage the enactment of appropriate legislation. The revela-
tions made by the Department of Justice study will be carefully
weighed by an understanding Court. The same Court will know
that unlike the rule of res judicata, stare decisis is not "a uni-
versal inexorable command"'28 0 and that at best it has but "a
limited application in the field of constitutional law."281
These factors, buttressed by the fact that other federal govern-
ments have continued to function uninterruptedly although there
the earlier rules of immunity have disappeared, 282 may induce
the Court to depart from their jural pronouncements of past
decades. Law school deans and professors, lawyers and laymen,
and students and politicians are well prepared for the formal
obituary of the time-worn dusty doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity. It is the nomenclature of a disappearing age!
278. Marshall, C. J., in Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheaton 419,
446.
279. Sen. Res. No. 303, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), 83 Cong. Rec. 9549
(Juno 16, 1938).
280. Brandeis, J., in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co. (1932) 285
U. S. 393, 405.
281. Stone and Cardozo, J.J., concurring in St. Joseph Stockyards v.
United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 94.
282. Powell, McCulloch v. Maryland in Canada and Australia (1933) 31
Mich. L. Rev. 797.
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